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ABSTRACT 
This study assesses the costs and ensuing macroeconomic impacts of the 
proposed Directive on large combustion plants for each EC country including 
proposals made up to the end of 1986. 
The study focusses on macroecon~c indicators such as gross domestic 
product or GOP (value of total production within a country), employment, 
private consumption, current balance of payments account, consumer prices 
and the balance of government budget (revenue less expenditures). 
In addition to interactions within the separate national economies, analysis 
of the interdependancies between them is examined by the use of an inter-
national rrodel. 
VOLUME 2 contains the Technical Document I : "Assessment of Investments, 
costs and emission reduction" and Technical Document II: "INTERLINK -
modification and detailed results". 
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KEYNOTE 
The Brussels Commission began to broach 
the idea of a common approach 
uniting European forces 
to reduce pollution from all sources 
Some draft Directives formulated 
are now intensiviley debated 
the final outcome's still unclear 
but may evolve within a year 
Let's hope these efforts do not fail, 
so history can tell the tale 
of rising PH, healthy trees 
and other happy trends like these 
(part of a poem written by Ian. M. Torrens of the OECD) 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
I. Introduction 
'Acid-rain' is one of the major environmental problems in the European 
Community. Power plants, refineries and industries, through their sul-
phur and nitrogen oxides emissions, are to a large extent causing the 
problem. Presently the European Community is negotiating on strategies 
to control these acidifying emissions. Recent discussions have focused 
on the draft Directive on large combustion plants, proposed by the 
Commission of the European Communities. The costs and expected economic 
effects for the EC countries constitute one of the major elements in 
these discussions. 
This study assesses the costs and ensuing macroeconomic impacts of the 
draft Directive on large combustion plants for each EC country. It in-
corporates proposals made during discussions towards the end of 1986 on 
the contents of the Directive. 
The study focuses on macroeconomic indicators such as gross domestic 
product, or GDP (value of total production within a country), employ-
ment, private consumption, current balance (the current account of the 
balance of payments) , consumer prices and balance of government budget 
(revenues minus expenditures). The extent and direction of the macro-
economic impacts of the Directive was not clear at the outset; pollu-
tion control costs generally have a negative impact but investments in 
pollution control equipment are likely to exert a positive influence on 
the economy. 
A method to assess the net overall influence is to use a macroeconomic 
model. A special feature of the pollution control program evaluated 
here is the fact that it is to be carried out simultaneously in all EC 
member countries. In addition to interactions within the separate na-
tional economies, analysis of the interdependencies between these 
economies is also at issue. This warrants the use of an international 
model. 
This summary has the following contents: 
- introduction to the macroeconomic model INTERLINK of the OECD, 
- description of abatement strategies in each country, 
- presentation of emission abatement costs and investments and the 
impact on electricity prices, 
--- ~~ -~~~ ~ -~~~ --~ ~~~---~~---~--~- -·-~- ~~~-~ ---·---· ~~ ~~--~~-~-- --~--
XIV 
- presentation of macroeconomic impacts, as simulated with INTER-
LINK, 
- discussion on elements of uncertainty, 
- main conclusions and recommendations for further research. 
II. INTERLINK o~ the OECD 
The International Linkage model, or INTERLINK, of the OECD was used to 
assess the macroeconomic consequences. INTERLINK is generally used for 
forecasting ('OECD Economic Outlook'), simulating and targeting econ-
omic variables. It is for example being used for the simulation of the 
impact of equalising VAT rates within the EC. 
INTERLINK is a medium-term world model in which the economies of 23 
OECD countries, including 11 EC countries (Belgium and Luxembourg are 
modelled jointly) and 8 non-OECD regions, are modelled separately. 
These separate models can be linked via world trade and financial 
flows. In this way the influences of one country or region on the rest 
of the world economy, and resulting feedback effects, are taken into 
account. 
INTERLINK was adapted for the purpose of this study. The major modifi-
cations are related to: 
- the insertion of pollution control investments as a special form 
of fixed business investments, 
- the inclusion of the impact of pollution control investments and 
costs on the gross domestic product, 
the reflection of pollution control costs in rising prices. 
This adapted model was used as follows: 
- a projection was made of the economic development without pollu-
tion control measures (base-line projection), 
- a projection was made of this development including the exogenous-
ly determined costs and investments of emission abatement, 
- the differences between these projections were reported as annual 
differences in economic indicators over the baseline projection. 
III. Abatement strategies in each country 
to meet the Directive 
The draft Directive pertaining to S0 2 and NOx emissions stipulates 
that: 
1) new plants larger than 50 MW thermal capacity must comply with 
emission standards which are related to the size of the plant; 
2) EC member states are to reduce total emissions from large combus-
tion plants by the end of 1995. 
The following percentage reductions (which use 1980 as a base year) 
reflect discussions from late 1986: 
- S0 2 emissions are to be reduced by a minimum of 45% except in 
XV 
Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg (allowed a standstill), Portugal 
(allowed an increase) and Spain (at least a 10% reduction), 
- NOx emissions are to be reduced by a minimum of 30% except in 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal (granted a standstill), Greece 
(allowed an increase) and Spain (at least a 10% reduction). 
Assumptions on the strategy in ea~h country 
Strategies to control emissions may range from technical measures, such 
as flue gas desulphurization, to a switch in fuel mix or additional 
energy conservation measures. In this study however, only technical 
abatement measures are examined. 
Due to a lack of data it was not possible to make a firm estimate of 
the abatement measures needed to meet the proposed EC emission stan-
dards for new, large industrial plants. Consequently the emissions from 
large plants (power as well as industrial) are reduced as follows: 
- measures are taken to meet emission standards for new, large power 
plants, 
- if this does not lead to the required percentage reduction, addi-
tional measures on existing power plants or more stringent ones on 
new power plants were assumed to be taken. 
Some EC countries have already legislation to control S0 2 and NOx 
emissions. If these policies are more stringent than the EC Directive 
the abatement measures of the national legislation are incorporated in 
the analysis. If the national policy is less stringent, additional 
measures are assumed to meet the requirements of the Directive. 
Strategies to control sulphur dioxide in each EC country 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands are imple-
menting their own national strategies which will effect a reduction in 
emissions greater than that of the Directive. France, Luxembourg and 
Portugal do not have to take measures. Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom are assumed to install flue gas desulphu-
rization on new power plants and, if needed, flue gas desulphurization 
on existing power plants. 
Strategies to control nitrogen oxides in each EC country 
Germany, in carrying out its national policy, more than meets the re-
quired reduction. The Dutch national policy is insufficient to meet the 
total reduction required by the Directive and additional combustion mo-
dification is assumed. France, Greece and Luxembourg do not have to 
take measures. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
the United Kingdom initially implement combustion modifications to meet 
emission standards for new power plants. If this is insufficient to 
meet the total reduction additional measures are taken in the most cost 
effective way. This involves selecting among two stage combustion, com-
bustion modification and selective catalytic reduction. 
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IV Costs and investments 
Absolute volume of costs and investments 
The volume of emissions being abated and the costs per ton of emission 
abated, determine the costs for each country. Generic and country spe-
cific factors, such as the selected abatement technologies, determine 
differences in costs among countries. 
so2 abatement technologies distinguished are: flue gas desulphuriza-
tion, fluidized bed combustion, dry sorbent injection, low sulphur coal 
and low sulphur, heavy fuel oil. The accent is on flue gas desulphuri-
zation since this technique is expected to be used on new power 
plants. 
Table I. Factors determining abatement costs 
Country specific data 
* Emissions to be abated 
* Abatement strategy in each 
EC country 
Generic data 
* Relation size and investment 
(economies of scale) 
* Type and specifications of fuel 
* Capacity of combustion plants 
* Life time new and existing plants 
* Fixed operating cost (% of invest-
ment) 
(size, new, existing) 
* Energy efficiency of plant 
* Interest rate 
* Operating hours 
* Electricity price 
* Wagesum per man year 
* Direct exploitation employment 
* Prices of water, ammonia, lime-
stone and catalyst 
Table II. Investments and costs (in million ECU's in 1985 prices) 
Country CEC minimum Investments Annual Emission 
reduction costs abated 
(% of 1980) (1985-1995) (1995) (kton)(l995) 
so2 NOx so2 NOx S0 2 NOx S02 NOx 
Belgium 45 30 238 26 46 2 67 21 
Denmark 45 30 436 65 103 7 201 78 
France 45 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FRGermany'~'' * 45 30 4769 1620 977 667 1716 727 
Greece 0 0* 31 0 11 0 25 0 
Ireland 0 0 168 22 40 3 64 20 
Italy 45 30 2319 577 439 189 753 460 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands*** 45 30 633 83 129 7 256 52 
Portugal 0* 0 0 149 0 29 0 63 
Spain 10 10 500 51 93 4 180 95 
United Kingdom 45 30 3160 289 628 28 1344 339 
EEC < 45 < 30 12253 2882 2455 935 4606 1878 
ir granted an increase 
*,( actual reduction higher than the required target for both so2 and 
NOx· Costs and emission abated correspond with these higher re-
ductions. 
*** actual reduction for so2 higher than required target. Costs and 
emission abated correspond with the higher reduction. 
XVII 
NOx abatement technologies selected are: selective catalytic reduc-
tion, combustion modification, two stage combustion and fluidised bed 
combustion. The accent is on combustion modifications. 
Table II. shows that, in an absolute sense, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom bear most of the costs of con-
trolling S0 2 emissions. Germany and to a lesser extent Italy will face 
substantial costs in connection with the control of NOx emissions. 
Costs as percentage of the gross domestic product 
Germany's high costs relative to its 1985 GDP (see figure I) reflect 
that country's stringent national policy. Denmark, due mainly to its 
domestic S0 2 control policy, and Ireland, due to the absolute amount of 
emissions to be abated, also face high costs. Costs in Belgium, France, 
Greece, Luxembourg and Spain, are relatively small chiefly because the 
volume of emissions to be abated is small. The need to apply selective 
catalytic reduction to control NOx emissions explains the relatively 
high costs for: Germany (as a consequence of its national policy), 
Italy, and Portugal. Generally, NOx control costs are negligible. 
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Figure I. Abatement costs in 1995 as percentage of GDP in 1985 
Impact on the industrial electricity price 
The pollution control costs borne by power plants lead to an increase 
in electricity production costs and therefore in the price of electri-
city. The increase in price that might result from pollution abatement 
is shown in figure II. The extent of the impact is influenced by the 
share of non-fossil fuels in electricity generation, electricity inten-
sity (electricity consumption/GOP) and, of course, the volume of emis-
sion abatement costs. 
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Figure II. Impact on the industrial electricity price (% increase 
1995) 
V. The macroeconomic impacts with INTERLINK 
V.I. Introduction 
5.0 
The database of the OECD model allowed a simulation for a maximum pe-
riod of 10 years (1988-1997). It was assumed that the investments in 
emission abatement were to take place in the period 1988-1993. This 
permitted simulation of the macroeconomic impact for a period following 
such investments, i.e. 1994-1997. Only in the longer term can the nega-
tive impaGts of pollution control costs be fully reflected in the eco-
nomy. 
The impacts are presented on those key indicators which are closely 
related to main targets of economic policy: economic growth, prevention 
of inflation, equity on the balance of payments and full employment. 
These impacts are presented as differences between an economic develop-
ment with and without pollution control. For example, in country X con-
sumption is projected to grow with 2% annually during the coming 
decade. As a result of the pollution control, such as that required by 
the Directive, consumption is expected to grow only 1.95% annually over 
the same period. The difference in consumption over the baseline, 
caused by pollution control, thus is 0.05%. These differences are dis-
cussed here and are generally presented as (average) annual percentage 
differences in the specific perio~: 1988-1993 and 1994-1997. 
Results are presented for the abatement of: 
- so2 emissions, 
- NOx emissions, 
simultaneous abatement of both emissions. 
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V.2. Results for 502 : Similarities among countries 
Although the macroeconomic impacts differ across countries the results 
(table III and IV) display a similar pattern. 
During the period in which the investments take place (1988-1993) eco-
nomic activity, as reflected in the gross domestic product (GOP), in-
creases in all countries due to the additional expenditures on pollu-
tion control investments. Since production is raised, employment 
increases as well. Investments increase not only in response to 
pollution control investments; because the level of production is 
raised, business sectors are stimulated to raise other investments as 
well. The higher level of investments and GDP cause imports to rise. As 
a result the current balance deteriorates. Consumer prices rise slight-
ly, and private consumption decreases as a consequence of the gradual 
increase in pollution control costs. Government financial balances 
improve chiefly because the rise in the level of output and national 
income generate higher tax revenues. 
TABLE III Macroeconomic impacts of controlling so2 emissions 
for large EC-countries 
FR GER ITA UKM 
Gross domestic product 
1988 - 1993 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.06 
1994 - 1997 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.05 
Private consumption 
1988 - 1993 .. -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
1994 - 1997 .. -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 
Current balancel 
1988 - 1993 0.10 -0.21 -0.18 -0.22 
1994 - 1997 -0.11 -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 
Employment 
1988 - 1993 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.03 
1994 - 1997 0.02 -0.11 0.01 -0.05 
Consumer prices 
1988 - 1993 .. 0.34 0.34 0.43 
1994 - 1997 .. 0.24 0.10 0.20 
Government financial Bal. 2 
1988 - 1993 .. 0.13 0.10 0.08 
1994 - 1997 .. 0.06 0.12 0.10 
All changes expressed as average annual percentage changes from 
baseline levels 
1 ) billion $ 
2) % of baseline gross domestic product 
.. not available 
XX 
In the next period (1994-1997) the macroeconomic impacts are more nega-
tive: pollution control investments cease and the pollution control 
costs induce a decline. Consumer prices and export prices are generally 
at a higher level as a result of higher pollution control costs. Conse-
quently consumption declines and, in countries whose competitive posi-
tion deteriorates, exports decline as well. The decrease in invest-
ments, exports and consumption causes a decrease in GDP. In this period 
investments not only decrease due to the fact that no pollution control 
investments take place but also since production decreases and pollu-
tion control costs increase. The lower level of production explains the 
lower level of employment. In most countries the current b&lance 
remains more negatively influenced; although imports are reduced, due 
to the lower level of output, exports decrease as well. Government 
financial balances remain positively influenced since nominal income 
and thus tax revenues increase; the decrease in real national income in 
this period is offset by an increase in prices. 
In almost all countries the positive macroeconomic impacts during the 
investment period exceed the negative impacts in the subsequent pe-
riod. 
TABLE IV Macroeconomic impacts of controlling so2 eml3Sions for 
small EC countries. 
Gross domestic 
product 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Private consumption 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Current balancel 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Employment 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Consumer prices 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Government finan-
cial Bal.2 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
BLX 
0.12 
-0.03 
0.02 
-0.08 
0.02 
0.03 
0.06 
0.01 
0. 15 
0.33 
0.06 
0.04 
DEN 
0.17 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.15 
-0.06 
-0.03 
0.05 
0.04 
0.20 
0.36 
0.10 
0.06 
GRE 
0.06 
0.05 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.02 
0.07 
0.13 
0.01 
0.00 
IRE 
0.12 
-0.21 
0.00 
-0.29 
-0.05 
-0.09 
0.05 
-0.03 
0.45 
0.56 
0.01 
-0.16 
NET 
0.12 
-0.08 
0.01 
-0.03 
-0.03 
-0.09 
0.09 
-0.04 
0.21 
0.48 
0.09 
0.01 
POR 
0.08 
0.03 
-0.01 
-0.02 
0.03 
0.01 
SPA 
0.09 
0.03 
0.03 
-0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.05 
0.02 
0.14 
0.19 
0.03 
0.01 
All changes expressed as average annual percentage changes from 
baseline levels 
1 ) billion $ 
2) % of baseline gross domestic product 
. . not available 
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V.3. Results for 50 2 : Differences between 
countries 
Despite the similarities in impacts from abating S0 2 emissions, there 
are also differences between countries: a predominantly positive influ-
ence is realised in France, Portugal, Spain and Greece but a more nega-
tive influence is exerted upon Ireland. 
The most important factors which explain differences are: 
- the absolute amount of pollution control costs and investments, 
- the degree to which EC countries are dependent on exports and im-
ports especially intra-EC trade, 
- the reflection of pollution control costs in prices, of prices in 
money wages and, of money wages in prices. 
France and Portugal 
France and Portugal have no S0 2 abatement costs. They benefit via an 
improvement in competitive position and world trade volume. In both 
countries GDP and employment are raised due to the increase in ex-
ports. 
Greece and Spain 
For Greece and Spain the economic impact of abating S0 2 emissions is 
unmistakably positive, mainly due to the low level of pollution control 
costs. This low level of costs causes prices to rise only modestly. As 
a result the relative export price improves and exports increase. This 
increase in exports accounts for the positive long term impact on gross 
domestic product and employment. 
Ireland 
For Ireland the macroeconomic impact is rather negative. The high level 
of pollution control costs, the high import coefficient and the large 
share of imports from EC countries, particularly the United Kingdom, 
are the causes. The high import leakage dampens the positive impact of 
the expenditures in pollution control investments in the period 1988-
1993. Moreover price increases, resulting from the domestic pollution 
control programme, are reinforced by the sharp increase in import pri-
ces. Consequently competitiveness deteriorates, exports decrease and 
the impact on the current balance is exacerbated. 
Belgium and the Netherlands 
For the Netherlands and Belgium impacts closely resemble the basic pat-
tern although the macroeconomic impact is slightly better in Belgium, 
especially in the period 1994-1997. Performance is better in Belgium 
since pollution control costs in the Netherlands are twice as high as 
in Belgium. Consequently export prices rise more in the Netherlands, 
exports decrease more and gross domestic product, employment and cur-
rent balance are less favourably influenced. An exception is the level 
of consumption in the Netherlands which declines less than in Belgium. 
. ------------------------------ -------------- - ------------------------- ---------·----
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Denmark 
For Denmark the macroeconomic impacts are more positive than for the 
Netherlands. Gross domestic product and business fixed investment ini-
tially rise more sharply since pollution control investments are hig-
her. In the second period the impact on consumption is more negative 
than in the Netherlands. This results from price increases being re-
flected less in the increase in money wages (wage indexation): real 
wages decline so that consumption declines as well. The Danish economy, 
however, is less influenced by increasing import prices since Denmark 
is less dependent on the EC for imports. As a result price increases 
are only modest and the Danish competitive position deteriorates less 
and the impact on gross domestic product, employment and current 
balance is more favourable in Denmark. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
The macroeconomic impacts for Germany are more or less neutral: posi-
tive during the investment period and negative thereafter. The positive 
impacts are relatively large due to the large size of the pollution 
control programme. The rise in consumer prices is modest, if related to 
the abatement costs, since prices are less reflected in w~ge changes. 
Italy 
Results for Italy are more positive than for Germany: employment re-
mains positive whereas consumer price increases are smaller. The size 
of the abatement programme in Italy is about two-thirds of the German 
efforts so the initial positive impact on gross domestic product is 
proportionally lower. Italy's competitive position is less affected 
than Germany's due to the lower pollution control costs. As a result 
exports are less negatively influenced, consumption declines only 
slightly in the period 1994-1997 and the decrease in the gross domestic 
product in the second period is only small. 
United Kingdom 
For the United Kingdom the macroeconomic impacts are more negative than 
for Germany: the positive impacts are smaller and the unfavourable 
impacts, e.g. on the current balance and the price level, are larger. 
This occurs even though the costs and investments for abating S0 2 
emissions, as percentage of GDP, are about the same size in both coun-
tries. The differences are chiefly caused by the sharper, but more tem-
porary, increase in export prices in the UK. As a result the compe-
titive position of the UK economy, and consequently exports, deterio-
rate more than in Germany. This has a negative, but declining impact on 
the gross domestic product and employment. 
XXIII 
V.4. RESULTS FOR NOx 
The macroeconomic impact of abating NOx emissions for most countries 
is smaller than that for the abatement of S0 2 emissions due to the re-
latively low costs of abating NOx emissions. The basic pattern for 
both emissions is similar: a positive impact during the investment pe-
riod and a slightly negative impact thereafter. 
Results for most countries are insignificant and fairly neutral due to 
the very small volume of costs. For France and Greece the impact is 
positive since these countries do not need to control NOx emissions 
and benefit from the increase in demand in other EC countries. Conse-
quently exports, employment and GOP increase. Only prices go up slight-
ly as a result of increasing import prices. For Germany, Italy and Por-
tugal the impact is somewhat more important (see table V) since NOx 
control costs are somewhat higher. 
TABLE V Macroeconomic impacts of controlling NOx emissions 
for a selection of countries 
Gross domestic product 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Private consumption 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Current balancel 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Employment 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Consumer prices 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
Government financial Bal. 2 
1988 - 1993 
1994 - 1997 
DEN 3 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.03 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.06 
0.01 
0.00 
POR 
0.08 
0.02 
0.03 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.02 
0.03 
0.01 
0.08 
0.13 
0.02 
0.00 
GER 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.02 
-0.15 
-0.21 
0.05 
-0.03 
0.15 
0.12 
0.06 
0.04 
ITA 
0.03 
0.02 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.05 
-0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
0.09 
0.04 
0.03 
0.04 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.00 
-0.02 
0.00 
0.02 
0.01 
-0.01 
0.06 
0.06 
0.01 
0.01 
All charges figures expressed as annual average percentage changes 
from baseline levels 
1) billion $ 
2 ) % of baseline gross domestic product 
3 ) both countries are included to compare their (insignificant) 
impacts, with impacts for Portugal, Germany and Italy 
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The macroeconomic impacts are more negative for Germany than for Italy. 
In the first period exports from Italy rise due to the increase in de-
mand in other EC countries, e.g. Germany. This is also due to the im-
proving competitive position of Italy which results from it's relati-
vely smaller abatement costs. As a consequence exports fall less and 
employment and production remain more positive in the subsequent pe-
riod. For Portugal the impacts are positive. This is due to the high 
level of pollution control investments and to the increase in exports 
in the first period, resulting from increased EC demand. Although do-
mestic pollution control costs do negatively affect the impacts, the 
positive impacts on GDP, employment and consumption dominat~. 
V.5. Results for the simultaneous control of 
50 2 and HOx emissions 
A major conclusion of the analysis is that even the simultaneous abate-
ment of S0 2 and NOx emissions has only marginal macroeconomic impacts 
for all EC countries. Only for a few indicators and for a few coun-
tries, are the impacts of the proposed Directive higher than one tenth 
of fluctuations in macroeconomic indicators, as observed c:er the past 
ten years. In general the impacts of the simultaneous abatement of both 
emissions, summarised over both periods, are positive for gross domes-
tic product, investments and employment; negative for consumption, cur-
rent balance, and consumer prices (which are higher). 
0.20 
0.15 
0.10 
GP 0.05 (annual 
change 0.00 
o/o) 
-0.05 
-0.10 
-0.15 
~ 1988-1993 
-0.20 
m 1994-1997 
-0.25 
COUNTRY 
Figure III Impact of combined control of S0 2 and NOx emissions on GDP 
Within the boundaries of these small impacts the combined control of 
S0 2 and NOx has a predominantly negative impact, on GDP (illustrated 
in figure III) and employment, for only one country: Ireland. In the 
United Kingdom employment is negatively affected but the gross domestic 
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product, over both periods, is hardly affected. Net impacts are posi-
tive for Spain, Portugal and Greece and to a smaller extent Italy. The 
eventual impact for the remaining countries is generally neutral to 
positive although somewhat more negative for Germany and the Nether-
lands and more positive for Belgium, and Denmark. The impacts for 
France are positive as well. 
VI. Elements of uncertainty 
Volume of abatement costs and investments 
A sensitivity analysis indicated that for most countries costs, for the 
abatement of S0 2 emissions, would not be altered substantially if an 
estimate of the impact of emission standards for new industrial plants 
were to be included. Except for France, Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
where costs would probably be higher, and for Ireland, where costs 
could be lower. These results however depend very much on the assumed 
volume of new industrial plants larger than 300 MWth. 
Costs could be higher as well if countries strongly prefer to buy 
domestic, instead of cheaper imported, pollution control equipment. In 
doing so abating S0 2 emissions could be more expensive for Ireland, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. This preference would not only strengthen 
the negative macroeconomic impacts of pollution control costs but would 
enlarge the positive impacts of the investments as well. The latter 
being resulting from the higher investments and the lower import 
leakage. 
Costs for S0 2 as well as NOx could be lower if abatement measures 
such as fuel switches, the use of lower sulphur coal and combustion 
modifications on new industrial plants and energy conservation were 
included. 
Constant versus flexible interest rates 
An analysis with INTERLINK showed that the Directive would have more 
negative macroeconomic impacts, for virtually all countries, if in-
terest rates were floating instead of being fixed, as was assumed. 
Employment, GDP, government financial balance would be less positive 
due to the increased interest rate but consumer prices would be slight-
ly lower. 
A flexible instead of a fixed exchange rate 
A flexible, instead of the assumed fixed, exchange rate is expected to 
cause a more positive impact on most macroeconomic indicators, although 
prices could increase somewhat more. The main reason for this is that 
exports decrease less. 
The direct import coefficient of investments in emission abatement 
This study assumes that the direct import share of investments in pol-
lution control corresponds with that for total fixed investments. This 
XXVI 
assumption could imply an underestimation of the positive impacts for 
Germany, since this country has a leading position in Europe with res-
pect to the control of S0 2 and NOx emissions. 
Exclusion of damage reduction 
Since it was impossible to include the macroeconomic impacts of reduc-
tions in environmental damage, potentially positive macroeconomic im-
pacts of the draft Directive were excluded. 
VII. Conclusions 
Despite these elements of uncertainty the major conclusion of this stu-
dy is not affected. The proposed Directive on large combustion instal-
lations is likely to have only small, but positive macroeconomic im-
pacts during the period in which the investments in air pollution con-
trol take place. In the subsequent period the proposed Directive is 
expected to have small but negative impacts on the economies of most EC 
member states. 
Given this conclusion the Directive is expected to have a predominantly 
positive influence for France, Portugal, Spain and Greece end to a les-
ser extent Italy. A more negative influence is exerted upon Ireland. 
For the remaining countries effects are more or less neutral although 
more positive for Denmark and Belgium and less positive for the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. Several elements of uncertainty 
however could affect this distribution of positive and negative impacts 
among countries. 
VIII. Suggestions for further research 
The following research items, partly related to the main elements of 
uncertainty, are suggested: 
- inclusion of other abatement strategies such as fuel switches, 
energy conservation, low sulphur fuels and measures for new indus-
trial plants; 
- extension of the study to other sectors: transport, industrial 
processes, domestic sectors and small industries; 
- development of abatement scenarios for other, related pollutants, 
i.e. volatile organic components and ammonia; 
- analysis of the macroeconomic impacts with alternative assumptions 
regarding the main elements of uncertainty; 
evaluation, where feasible in monetary terms, of the present and 
future damage ("benefits") of emission abatement strategies in the 
EC. 
Since the macroeconomic impacts of the Directive are only small, and 
since the resulting emission reductions are probably insufficient to 
lead to a full recovery of forests and to a standstill in acidification 
of soils and surface waters, it could be worthwhile to analyse the im-
pacts of more stringent abatement of 'acid-rain' in the European Commu-
nity. 
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IHTRODUCTIOH 
1.1. Introduction 
The urgency of the environmental problems associated with acidification 
is acknowledged by the European Commission. The various EC member 
states are affected by acidification in different ways. The damage is 
to a large extent caused by sources throughout Europe which emit sul-
phur- and nitrogen oxides to the air: a shared resource. Clearly, the 
European Community constitutes a suitable 'supra-national' body of ad-
ministration to formulate and direct environmental management strate-
gies. 
Presently within the Community negotiations take place on strategies 
which imply that national governments select policy measures so that 
national emissions are reduced by a percentage over the 1980 level. 
Discussions within the EC focus especially on the proposed council Di-
rective on large combustion plants. But the Europarliament also ex-
pressed its view in a resolution. In order to set the percentage reduc-
tions, it can be meaningful to know the efforts required from different 
EC member states, in terms of additional investments, costs and resul-
ting macroeconomic effects. 
This study aims to assess these economic impacts of policy measures for 
the reduction of acidifying emissions in the EC. It is an internationa-
lisation of a comparable study that was performed in the Netherlands 
(LMO, 1985; Klaassen and Nentjes, 1986) in cooperation with the Nether-
lands Central Planning Bureau) 1 • 
1.2. Scope 
The aim of the study is to assess the (macro)-economic impact of con-
trol strategies for sulphur and nitrogen emissions as proposed and dis-
cussed by the Commission of the European Community, in its Directive on 
large combustion plants. 
In addition it was proposed to assess the macroeconomic impact of a 
more stringent scenario, provisionally termed 'Europarliament'. 
1 References are to be found after chapter 7. 
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This aim was approached by addressing the following questions: 
1) What is the 'most-likely' strategy adopted by the EC countries to 
meet the emission reductions required? 
2) What additional investments and costs are associated with this 
strategy? 
3) What are the second and higher order economic effects caused by 
the strategies selected? 
During the study it proved impossible to tackle the proposed strategy 
of the Europarliament. Due to time constraints the study was necessari-
ly limited to the proposed Directive on large combustion plants. 
The study takes the draft Directive on large combustion plants, as for-
mulated end 1983, as a starting point. However, discussions within the 
Council of environmental ministers, reflecting the situation end 1986, 
are taking into account as well and formulated as additional assump-
tions on the contents of the Directive. 
In principle reduction strategies might range from technical measures 
such as flue gas desulphurization and selective catalytic reduction to 
a switch in fuel mix, or additional energy conservation measures. After 
a feasibility study, however, the scope was limited to technical abate-
ment measures. The question of additional energy conservation was dealt 
with in a separate feasibility study (Becht, 1987). 
The question on second and higher order economics effects deals in par-
ticular with effects on: 
- macroeconomic key indicators such as gross domestic product, em-
ployment, imports, export, inflation, government budget deficit, 
- prices of energy. 
This study focuses, however, on the impact of macroeconomic key indica-
tors since this part of the study was expected to reveal aspects which 
were not already addressed in other studies (Schulz, 1987; Arthur D. 
Little, 1984; Rentz, 1986; Cambridge Decision Analysis/Environmental 
Resources Limited, 1986). The principal usefullness of the approach is 
its comprehensiveness and analytical soundness since it asseses the net 
overal influence exerted upon the economy. In a sense it is more accu-
rate than a mere accounting of costs and benefits since it takes into 
account the interdependencies in and between national economies which 
might reveal unexpected 'costs' and 'benefits'. 
Still a certain modesty is needed since the assessment is not complete. 
Due to lack of data questions regarding the extent of the damage pre-
vented by the reduction of the emissions are only partly addressed and 
no macroeconomic analysis was possible. 
In addition to this macroeconomic assessment the impact on the electri-
city prices was addressed. 
Summarizing the focus of this study is the assessment of costs, invest-
ments and ensueing macroeconomic impacts of the proposed and discussed 
Directive large combustion plants. 
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These impacts are studied for the first stage of the Directive, up to 
1995, for both sulphur as well as nitrogen oxides. To assess the macro-
economic impact use was made of an existing macroeconomic model: 
INTERLINK of the OECD. 
1.3. Remainder (Reading guide) 
Conclusions are dealt with in chapter 7. The macroeconomic results of 
the simulations with the OECD INTERLINK model are the subject of chap-
ter 6. The preceding chapter 5 describes the costs and investments of 
the abatement strategy in each country. The question on the abatement 
strategy in each country is tackled in chapter 4. Theoretical aspects 
of the assessment of macroeconomic impacts are dealt with in the 
chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 3 describes the main features of the modified 
version of the OECD INTERLINK model used in this study. An introduction 
to macroeconomic effects of pollution control is to be found in chapter 
2. 
More details on the feasibility of estimating the (monetary) value of 
the damage prevented when reducing acidifying emissions are to be found 
in appendix A. Detailed background information is included in two 
separate, technical documents: 
TECHNICAL DOCUMENT I : Assessment of investments, costs and emission 
reduction 
TECHNICAL DOCUMENT II: INTERLINK: modifications and detailed re-
sults. 
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2. MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF POLLUTION CONTROL: 
A TYPOLOGY 
2.1. Introduction 
Abatement measures for (air-)pollution act upon the economy through va-
rious channels and may have a contractionary or expansionary impact 
(Rose, 1983; OECD, 1984). One methodology to capture such a broad range 
of impacts is to use an existing macroeconomic model and, where neces-
sary, adapt it in order to include the specific characteristics of pol-
lution control. The principal usefulness of such an approach is its 
comprehensiveness and analytical soundness; it assesses the net overall 
influence exerted upon the economy. Such a 'macro' general equilibrium 
assessment is more accurate that a mere accounting of costs and bene-
fits since the former takes account of the interdependencies in an eco-
nomy. 
In this chapter four main categories of macroeconomic impacts of pollu-
tion control are distinguished: 
1) Effects of additional expenditures, 
2) Impact of additional pollution control (environmental) costs. 
3) Consequences of avoided environmental damage, 
4) Technological spin-off. 
Generally macroeconomic studies concentrate on the first two, neglect-
ing the remaining, categories. The approach is reasonably firm. Yet the 
firmness depends on the quality of the model and its ability to include 
the various relationships between environmental expenditures, costs and 
the economy. 
In section 2 (expenditures and costs) the methodology is described, the 
various channels of impact are discussed and the key factors that de-
termine the eventual outcome of the analysis are presented. Consequen-
ces of avoided environmental damage and technological spin-off are more 
uncertain and estimates so far are only very tentative. Section 3 indi-
cates the problems and potential of including the effects of reducing 
damage. Section 4 describes the difficulties in assessing the impact of 
technological spin-off. Conclusions are presented in section 5. 
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2.2. Effects of expenditures and costs 
Methodology 
The starting point of the macroeconomic evaluation is the time path of 
the additional investments and the net annual costs of the pollution 
control or environmental program. These investments and costs are dis-
aggregated into relevant categories such as capital costs (interest and 
depriciation), labour costs, costs of raw material and energy and di-
rect import coefficient of the investments. They are presented in con-
stant prices using a recent price level. In addition, data may be 
needed on the mode of financing the investments (capital market, inter-
nal business financing from current cash flows, government subsidies), 
the type of management (government, private sector) and who pays the 
costs. 
The second step involves making a base or reference projection for the 
economic development without the additional costs and investments of 
pollution control. Next a projection is made including the effects of 
the pollution control program. Differences in impact on economic varia-
bles between both projections that then arise can be ascribed to the 
environmental policy (CPB, 1982). 
Main causal relations 
After this brief outline of the methodology the main causal relations 
and dynamics of the impact of pollution control are discussed. A more 
detailed typology of macroeconomic channels of impact, as included in 
INTERLINK, is presented in the next chapter (section 3.5.). 
The main causal relations can be illustrated as follows. 
Additional environmental investments cause rising expenditures so that 
imports, but also domestic sales increase. Due to additional supplies 
(intermediary deliveries) direct employment and additional imports are 
generated. Operating the pollution control equipment has similar conse-
quences. These positive effects of additional expenditures influence 
the result especially in the period in which the environmental invest-
ments take place. In the same period, however, the environmental in-
vestments may cause a direct crowding out of (traditional) investments 
due to financial constraints. This has a negative influence on produc-
tion capacity, level of output and employment. The environmental in-
vestment may cause additional demand on the capital market and an up-
ward pressure on the interest rate depending on the way investments are 
financed. Rising pollution control costs for households will, other 
things being equal, reduce other private consumption. Consequences of 
pollution control costs are especially important after the investment 
period. 
The polluting industry, confronted with rising abatement costs which 
partly depend on government subsidies, will, depending on the market 
position, raise market prices and see business profits decline. This 
deterioration in competitiveness may cause a decrease in exports. Lower 
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business profits may cause a reduction in the volwne of new invest-
ments, production capacity and related jobs and may also cause an early 
scrapping (retirement) of existing capacity. 
Factors influencing the final impact 
Not only these channels of impact but also a number of dominant factors 
influence the eventual impact of a pollution control program and thus 
constitute a tool to explain differences in impact between countries: 
* The absolute and relative size of the environmental investments 
and costs 
* 
* 
the ratio of factor demand for capital, labour and import goods 
of the pollution control programme 
the mode of financing the investments (capital market, government 
subsidies, internal business financing) 
* the transmission of: 
* 
* 
* 
- pollution control costs into prices for final demand categories 
(e.g. consumer prices) 
prices into wage changes (wage price indexation) 
the monetary, exchange rate and budgetary (fiscal) policy 
the prevailing economic circumstances (e.g. unemployment, over 
capacity) 
the extent of 'openness' of a national economy and it's depen-
dence on international trade 
The above factors can be adstructed as follows. 
The larger the investments and co~ts the more serious the consequences 
will be. Not only the direct effects on quantities but also the indi-
rect impacts, through effects on prices, are affected. The relative 
size of the domestic environmental programma, compared to foreign poli-
cies and compared to the activity level of the home economy, is also 
important. A proportionally larger foreign program causes more import 
inflation but also lessens the deterioration of home competitiveness. 
This depends, among other things, on the sensitivity of the different 
prices of final demand categories for changes in foreign and domestic 
prices induced by the pollution control costs. 
A high direct import share implies a less favourable domestic impact 
whereas a labour intensive pollution control program results in a 
higher direct employment level. Capital intensity is reflected in the 
initial amount of investments and the amount of other, traditional in-
vestments crowded out. 
The mode of financing the environmental measures can vary among a 
strict application of the 'polluter-pays-principle', a more equal dis-
tribution using pollution charges, to financing via government subsi-
dies. Financing may take place on the capital market or from internal 
business revenues (cash flows). These differences are reflected in the 
final impact. 
The transmission of costs is also of importance. Wage earners may have 
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their wages indexed for changes in prices, taxes and social security 
contributions. Industries may partly be able to transmit costs in-
creases into market prices. 
An accomodating monetary policy can reduce or prevent the upward pres-
sure on the interest rate resulting from the environmental programme. 
The government's budget policy also influences the impact since its 
budget deficit may be raised, borrowing on the capital market may in-
creaset other expenditures may decrease or tax revenues may increase in 
order to cotnpensate for additional subsidies for environmental invest-
ments. Of course the budget deficit may also improve. The exchange rate 
policy modifies the initial impact on the balance of payments. A flex-
ible exchange rate can induce an increase in exports which may partly 
compensate for a decrease in exports; this decrease resulting from the 
raised price level caused by pollution control costs. 
The prevailing economic conditions influence the attractiveness of an 
environmental progran~a as well. In a situation of oyer capacity and 
unemployment the environmental programme reduces this surplus, thus 
mitigating price impacts and causing positive second and higher order 
effects. Whether or not reallocation occurs also depends on qualitative 
discrepancies of the labour market and the sectoral distribution of 
surplus capacity. 
In this international, European context it is important to note that if 
a country is strongly dependent on international trade the results of 
an internationally coordinated pollution control policy have a stronger 
impact on the home economy. Not only may exports benefit more from the 
increased world trade volume (due to foreign environmental expendi-
tures); the domestic price level will be influenced stronger through a 
more severe increase in prices of import goods. 
Various channels of impact and key factors thus determine the final 
impact of a pollution control program on macroeconomic indicators. The 
analysis so far suggests that macroeconomics is able to deal with all 
relevant categories of impact. This is somewhat misleading since the 
analyses of costs and expenditures have also received some criticism in 
the past (Rose, 1983; OECD, 1984; Klaassen, 1986). Moreover two catego-
ries of impact - damage reduction and technological spin off - have not 
yet been discussed; they are not included in conventional macroeconomic 
analysis. 
2.3. Effects of avoided environmental damage 
The main aim of the abatement of acidifying emissions is to reduce 
their negative impact on the environment. Although a vast amount of 
literature exists on this subject the available scientific knowledge at 
present does not allow a reliable estimate of the quantity of (moneta-
ry) dan1age that will be avoided as a result of reducing acidifying 
emissions (see Appendix A for details). This implies that a macroecono-
mic analysis of this impact is impossible due to lack of empirical da-
ta. 
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Damage reductions or benefits, according to the OECD (1984) can be 
classified as follows: "cost-reducing", "output-increasing" and "utili-
ty-increasing". It is in principle possible to use macroeconomic models 
to evaluate the impact of the first two categories since these are re-
flected in the gross national product. An example of "cost-reducing" 
benefits is a reduction in the costs, for producers, of adding additio-
nal lime to lakes and forests. An example of "output-increasing" bene-
fits is an increase in yields in agriculture or forestry, due to an 
increase in physical production, resulting from a decrease in ozone. 
Depending on the distribution of benefits over industries, consumers 
and government it can tentatively be elucidated that such a damage re-
duction, not surprisingly, is likely to have a positive impact on the 
economy (Nentjes, 1985; Klaassen, 1987). Still the major problem is to 
isolate this beneficial impact, of environmental improvement on gross 
domestic product and other economic indicators, from other factors that 
affect the level of productivity and output. 
For "util~ty-increasing" benefits, resulting from a decrease in acid 
deposition, this macroeconomic approach remains impossible since these 
benefits are not reflected in the gross domestic product. Examples of 
such benefits are: a reduction in expenditures of consumers on medical 
care due to a decrease in the corrosion of water supply systems or a 
reduction in the cost of home painting or car washing. These benefits . 
result in a reallocation of the household expenditures and do not have 
an (remarkable) effect on the gross domestic product. The benefits how-
ever do lead to an increase in welfare. Other examples of "utility-
increasing" benefits are the increase in welfare which directly results 
from an increase in recreational facilities in forests, reduced morta-
lity and morbidity and aesthetical improvements of historical buil-
dings. Econometric models do not account for these "utility-increasing" 
benefits and a macroeconomic assessment remains impossible. 
The main argument not to include the impact of damage reduction however 
is the lack of data on the extent of the damage. It seems to make more 
sense to direct research on the quantification, were possible monetary 
evaluation, of the reduction in damage, and its geographic distribution 
under different abatement scenario's, than to try and asses its macro-
economic impacts. 
2.4. Technological spin-off 
Another omission is the exclusion of technological spin-off. As a re-
sult of additional domestic or EC-wide demand for pollution control 
equipment, the domestic suppliers will obtain the opportunity to imple-
ment, and extend, their experience and improve their production pro-
cess. This 'learning-by-doing' may cause cost savings and lead to bet-
ter quality products. As a result, exports from these countries are 
expected to increase, certainly if, at a later stage, comparable mea-
sures are taken in other countries. Although numerous examples exist 
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of this technological spin-off, such as the strong position of Japanese 
suppliers of catalysts, empirical data are not sufficiently firm to 
allow a quantitive estimate of the additional export resulting of such 
a spin-off. Simulating the macroeconomic impact of such additional ex-
ports is reasonable straightforward (see Houweling, 1987) and tentative 
calculations for a specific Dutch case study (Nentjes, 1985; Klaassen, 
1987) did show a positive macroeconomic impact. But the order of magni-
tude remains questionable and can be challenged (Cope, 1987). The rela-
tion between stricter environmental standards, innovation, cost reduc-
tions and additional exports would need some more research efforts 
(Nentjes and Wiersma, 1987) to quantify the impact in a firm manner. 
2.5. Conclusions 
Measures to control (air-) pollution act upon the economy through va-
rious channels and may have a contractionary or expansionary impact. 
One methodology to capture these impacts is to use an existing macro-
economic model. Four main categories of macroeconomic impacts of pollu-
tion control can be distinguished: 
1. Effects of additional expenditures. 
2. The impact of additional pollution control (environmental) 
costs. 
3. Consequences of avoided environmental damage. 
4. Technological spin-off. 
Generally macroeconomic studies of the impact of pollution control con-
centrate on the first two categories, neglecting the remaining ones. 
The starting point of the macroeconomic evaluation of expenditures and 
costs is a time path of the additional investments and annual costs of 
the pollution control program. The second step involves making a refe-
rence projection for the economic development without the pollution 
control program. Next to that a projection is made including the pollu-
tion control program. Differences in economic variables that then arise 
can be ascribed to the environmental policy. 
A number of dominant factors such as the absolute size of the environ-
mental investments and costs, may explain differences in impact between 
countries. 
A macroeconomic analysis of the impact of avoided damage at present is 
impossible due to lack of empirical data on the amount of damage. Ma-
croeconomic models are in principle only able to capture "cost-reduc-
ing" and "output-increasing" benefits. A macroeconomic evaluation of 
"utility-improving" benefits is impossible since these benefits are not 
reflected in the gro~s domestic product. 
Empirical data are neither sufficiently firm to allow a quantitive es-
timate of the additional impact of technological spin-off. Hence these 
impacts hence cannot be included in the evaluation which implies a too 
negative picture of the macroeconomic impact. 
~---------~---·- ----------- -------· ---------------------
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3. IHTBRLINK: A MULTI-COUNTRY MODBL 
3.1. Introduction 
For the analysis of the macroeconomic impacts of pollution control 
measures one can make use of an existing macroeconomic model. To study 
the economic consequences of a coordinated EC acid deposition abatement 
programme the policy simulations have to be made with a model which 
takes into account the economic interactions between the countries in 
the EC, which simultaneously carry out the abatement programme. Such a 
model has to be modified in order to deal with the specific character-
istics of the pollution control program. 
This chapter, after explaining why the INTERLINK model of the OECD was 
selected, describes the structure and basic equations of INTERLINK 
(section 3.2). Secondly the modifications to the INTERLINK model, in-
troduced for the purpose of this study, are discussed (section 3.3). 
Subsequently the way in which investments and costs of pollution con-
trol are inserted into the model is presented (section 3.4). The suita-
bility of the model, after the modifications, is evaluated in section 
3.5. Conclusions are the subject of the final section (3.6). 
3.2. Description of OBCD's IHTBRLIHK 
3.2.1. Introduction 
In a feasibility study the suitability of four macroeconomic models for 
this project was evaluated: COMET and HERMES (both EEC models), CHASE 
INTERNATIONAL MODEL (Chase Econometrics inc.) and INTERLINK of the 
OECD. INTERLINK proved to be the ~ost suitable model. It is able to 
capture almost all relevant macroeconomic impacts of pollution control 
and the quality of the model is seen as being comparitively very high. 
The model is updated continuously to reflect new theoretical insigths 
and in addition results of the model are published frequently and are 
free for verification. Moreover and in contrast to e.g. HERMES, the 
model is operational and it is also being used for various types of 
studies. Due to the structural similarity of the different country mo-
dels INTERLINK is more transparant and results are more easily compar-
able. Finally the model is cost-effective, although users of the model 
are required to carry out the analysis themselves but with the assist-
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ance of the OECD in operating the model. 
Generally INTERLINK is used for forecasting (semi-annual 'OECD Economic 
Outlook'), simulating and targeting economic variables. One example is 
the impact of equalisation of VAT rates within the EC which is pre-
sently being carried out by the CEC. An other example is the impact of 
an oil price shock. 
For this study INTERLINK is used to obtain baseline forecasts and to 
simulate the effects of additional pollution control investments. 
3.2.2. Main features of the model 
Basic structure. 
INTERLINK is a short to medium term, semi-annual world model in which 
the economies of 23 OECD countries and 8 non-OECD regions are modelled 
seperately. These seperate models can be linked optionally via world 
trade and financial flows. In this way the influence of one country or 
region on the rest of the world economy, and feedback effects following 
from this interaction, are taken into account (see figure 1). After 
this overview of the basic structure the OECD area block, the non-OECD 
area block and world trade and financial linkages are presented. 
OECD-area bloCk 
Each country model comprises approximately 50 behavioural relations and 
some 100 identities. The models for the seven major OECD-countries 
(United States, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom) are considerably more detailed than those for smaller coun-
tries, although there is a high degree of structural similarity. 
Models for the major economies include detailed supply blocks based on 
production decisions. The production structure for these countries is 
based on a nested double CES production function of the putty/semiputty 
type in which capital, differentiated by vintage, energy and labour are 
combined. This long-run production structure is used to define a con-
cept of normal output. The actual' level of output is specified with the 
factor utilization rate (the ratio of actual to normal output) as the 
dependent variable. Independent variables are: costs, final sales (do-
mestic demand plus exports), non-energy imports of goods and services, 
and inventories. Derived factor demand equations are specified as dyna-
mic adjustments to desired factor inputs, in which the speed of adjust-
ment is influenced by a unit cost or profitability variable and/ or the 
prevailing factor utilization rate. Business energy demand adjusts in-
stantly to optimal levels. 
The supply structure, via input costs, is linked to the determination 
of output prices. The cost mark-up is influenced by the prices of for-
eign competitors on prices and aggregate demand effects which operate 
via the intensity of factor utilization. Endogenous labour supply, and 
hence unemployment, through behavioural participation rate equations is 
a final element of the supply blocks for the seven largest OECD-econo-
mies. 
Models of 
23 OECD 
countries 
Reports for 
domestic 
economic 
variables 
12 
Outward 
linkages 
Reports for 
international 
trade and 
financial 
variables 
Note: Outward linkages correspond to domestic 
variables that directly affect partner countries. These 
include import volumes, export prices, net capital 
inflows, wage rates, interest rates, and exchange 
rates. 
linkages 
Models of 
8 non-OECO 
regions 
Reports 
for 
non-OECD 
regions 
Inward linkages correspond to external variables that 
directly affect the domestic economy. These include 
export volumes, import prices and net capital 
outflows. 
Figure 1. INTERLINK, basic structure (OECD, 1983). 
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For the smaller OECD-countries no' consistent production function based, 
supply blocks are present; supply factors operate chiefly through price 
and wage equations. Labour supply is determined outside these models. 
Inside the smaller models the demand for labour is a function of the 
demand-determined production level and of real wages. Business fixed 
investment is dependent on output changes and long-term real interest 
rates. The concept of price formation is comparable with the one for 
major OECD-economies. 
In INTERLINK, government deficits are endogenous for all OECD-countries 
though modelled in rather less detail for the smaller economies. Pri-
vate consumption is a function of real disposable income, prices and 
real interest rates. The export volume is dependent on world trade 
(market growth) and on relative price competitiveness. The import volu-
me is determined primarily on the basis of aggregate world demand. Rel-
ative prices of imported and domestically produced goods are also a 
determinant of countries' imports. Wage rates have been modelled prima-
rily as a function of labour market conditions (rate of unemployment), 
trend productivity and prices. Oil prices are treated as an exogenous 
variable. 
For the seven largest OECD-countries money demand is modelled endoge-
nously and the short-term interest rate is an exogenous variable. 
Short-term rates can however be determined endogenously by the setting 
of monetary targets and the implicit inversion of the demand for money 
functions. The short-term rates in the other OECD-countries are deter-
mined as a function of these interest rates and of exchange rates. 
Long-term interest rates are determined through a distributed lag of 
short-term interest rates. 
Hon-OECD-area block 
For non-OECD-areas, INTERLINK contains rudimentary reduced-form models. 
An important role is played by the external purchasing-power of ex-
ports; how much a region is able to import given its export proceeds 
and import prices. 
World trade and financial linkage model 
This block of equations provides .a description of the principal mecha-
nisms through which the OECD-economies inter act with each other and 
with eight non- OECD-regions (see figure 2). The principal aim of this 
block is to take account of feedback effects from this interaction and 
to ensure global consistency of multi-country projections and simula-
tions. 
Trade flows 
Within each country and non-OECD regional model, import volumes and 
export prices are endogenously determined for given values of exchange 
rates, import prices and world trade. These values are passed on to the 
world trade block where they are converted to a common numeraire, taken 
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Figure 2. INTERLINK, trade and financial linkages (OECD, 1983). 
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to be the U.S. dollar. Next a consistent set of export volume and im-
port price estimates is determined through a weighting with market sha-
res of the import volumes and export prices. These are in turn passed 
back to the country models and on repeated iteration a convergent and 
internationally-consistent model solution is achieved: the sum of 
changes in countries' imports correspond to the sum of changes in coun-
tries' exports and changes in countries' export prices have their full 
counterpart in partner countries' import prices. 
Financial flows 
The financial linkages (capital flows) between the world economies are 
modelled as explicit equations for the effective exchange rate. Net 
capital flows are obtained from the balance of payments identity. In-
ternational financial linkages are based on a portfolio balance model 
of exchange rate determination. International consistency is ensured by 
cross country restrictions on parameters imposed during estimation. 
3.3. Modification of INTERLINK 
Introduction 
Additional pollution control investments cause r1s1ng expenditures, so 
that domestic sales increase. Due to additional supplies (intermediary 
deliveries) the related direct employment is increased. Operating the 
pollution control equipment has similar consequences. The polluting 
industry, confronted with rising abatement costs, the level also being 
influenced by government subsidies, will raise market prices. Deterio-
ration in competitiveness causes a decrease in exports. In the produc-
tion block the availability and utilisation of factors of production 
are described. If prices changes, resulting from 'passed on' pollution 
control costs, give rise in changes in the relative prices of factors 
of production (labour, capital, energy and materials) substitution and 
the selection of other production techniques may appear. 
Adjustments in INTERLINK 
INTERLINK has been adjusted to make the model suitable for dealing with 
the above specific characteristics of environmental expenditure. Envi-
ronmental expenditure can be classified into two main macroeconomic 
categories: 
- expenditure on pollution control, or environmental, equipment; 
- expenditure on exploitation requirements of pollution control, or 
environmental equipment. 
Environmental investments 
The first category is termed environmental investment. Data for this 
variable are determined outside INTERLINK. Inside the model these data 
are transformed from factor price~ to market prices; i.e., on the basis 
of the model equations for indirect taxes and subsidies, environmental 
·------ ----··---· -------- ---·-·-·-------· --· ------- ··--------·---------- -------
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investment inclusive of indirect taxes minus subsidies is calculated. 
By adding this new investment cat~gory to private fixed investment, 
environmental investment is treated in the same way as the already 
existing private fixed investment categories of INTERLINK. These endo-
genous mechanisms need no correction. 
However, to ensure that environmental capital costs are calculated, 
adjustments are necessary. In the models of the large countries envi-
ronmental investment is therefore added to business fixed investment in 
the equations determining the growth rate of normal longrun costs and 
of actual weighted costs. The environmental capital stock, determined 
in a new relationship, is added to business capital stock i.n the equa-
tions determining the inverse profitability variable and average normal 
costs. In this way the calculation of environmental capital costs (in-
terest and depreciation) in the cost relationships of the large country 
models of INTERLINK is guaranteed. These costs then enter the price 
equations automatically. In the models of the small economies explicit 
cost relationships are not present. Capital costs are therefore deter-
mined outside these models. These data are added directly to the equa-
tions determining consumer prices. Via the private consumption deflator 
the capital costs enter automatically the other price relationships of 
the models for the small countries. 
Environmental exploitation expenditure 
The second category, environmental exploitation expenditure, consists 
of expenditure on: 
energy used by environmental capital (pollution control equip-
ment) ; 
- labour to exploit environmental capital; 
- material to exploit environmental capital. 
Employment figures and energy and material expenditures are determined 
outside INTERLINK. Adjustments are made to ensure that exploitation 
employment influences total employment and productivity. By multiplica-
tion of the employment figures with the real wage rate, labour exploi-
tation expenditure is determined inside INTERLINK. After transformation 
to market prices environmental exploitation expenditure is added to the 
equation determining final domestic demand. 
"Demand-pull" effects on inflation are ensured by adding the environ-
mental exploitation expenditures to the equation of the price for total 
or final domestic demand. "Cost-push" effects on inflation are esta-
blished by adding the environmental expenditure categories to the con-
sumer price equation of the small country models and to the cost rela-
tionships of the models for the large countries. 
Environmental exploitation expenditures are also added to the equations 
determining indirect taxes and subsidies. 
Finally, adjustments are made to ensure that expenditure on energy and 
material for the exploitation of environmental capital influences 
industrial production, imports of energy, investments in stocks and the 
intensity of factor utilization. 
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3.4. Investments and costs of pollution control 
into INTERLINK 
This section starts with a description of general conversion of costs 
into input data for INTERLINK. Subsequently an adjustment in time hori-
zon is discussed. Finally, the insertion and modification of annual 
costs is presented. 
Conversion of costs into input data 
The costs submodel (see chapter 5, section 5.2) calculates the invest-
ments and costs of the Directive on large combustion plants in constant 
prices of 1985 1 ). Moreover costs and investments are expressed in mar-
ket prices, including Value Added Tax (VAT). Eventually however, both 
costs and investments are inserted into INTERLINK in national valuta, 
in prices of the INTERLINK base year (generally 1983) and at factor 
costs (excluding VAT). Costs and investments are converted into natio-
nal valuta using the 1985 exchange rate and in addition are expressed 
in base year prices applying price indexes of the OECD data base. In 
addition (generic) VAT is substracted to express costs and investments 
at factor costs. INTERLINK then calculates, country specific, VAT and 
subsidies endogenously (within the model). 
A shift in time horizon 
With respect to the time horizon the following transformation is made. 
In this study the first stage of the Directive on Large Combustion In-
stallations is observed, viz. the plan period 1/1/1985 until 1995. The 
majority of the air pollution control investments resulting from the 
Directive is expected to take place in the period 1988-1993. For a com-
plete picture it is necessary to simulate the macroeconomic impact also 
for some years (say four) after the investments take place since the 
negative impact of the costs generally only floats to the surface after 
the investment period. The database of the OECD INTERLINK model how-
ever, does not allow the projection of macroeconomic impacts beyond 
1992. Only for the period 1983-1992 a projection is possible. 
Therefore the following transformation is made. Investments take place 
in a period of six years: 1988-1993 in reality and 1983-1988 in the 
model. The economic impact is calculated for the period 1988-1997 in 
reality (which corresponds with 1983-1992 in the simulation), including 
a period of four years (1993-1997) in which no investments take place. 
This transformation is not expected to have a considerable impact since 
the results are not extremely sensitive for changes in the macroecono-
mic base line or reference projection. Moreover the macroeconomic situ-
ation i.e. unemployment in both periods; 1988-1997 (in reality) and 
1983-1992 (in the model), is not expected to be too diverging. 
1 ) Cost module calculates figures in German Deutschmarks. 
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Furthermore it was assumed that environmental investments, taking place 
from 1988-1993, are equally distributed over that period (each year 1/6 
of total investments). For Germany this procedure results in a small 
overestimate of the impact especially during the investment period 
since in reality investments are distributed over a longer period. This 
offers the advantage however, that efforts before 1988 (but after 1/1/ 
1985) are taken into account. 
Annual costs 
For the annual costs the same transformation of periods and conversion 
in national valuta, OECD base year and in factor costs take place. In 
reality these costs (in constant prices) increase from 1988-1993 and 
stabilise in the periods thereafter (1994-1997). In the model these 
periods are 1983-1988 and 1989-1992. 
The costs submodule distinguishes the next categories of annual costs: 
* capital costs (interest and depreciation) 
* operating costs: 
- fixed (insurance, local taxes, administration, maintenance and 
repair) 
materials (gypsum, catalys~, ammonia, water) 
- energy (electricity, steam) 
- wage sum. 
For the large country models capital costs are endogenously calculated 
from the environmental investments, using country specific interest 
rate and life time of the INTERLINK model. For the small country models 
these costs are exogenously calculated using specific lifetime and real 
interest rates (1985) of the OECD data base (see technical document I 
for details). 
Annual operating costs are treated as follows. Fixed operating costs 
and costs of materials are aggregated into one category and inserted 
into the model, while energy costs remain a separate subcategory. This 
facilitates linkage with prices distinguished in INTERLINK. The direct 
employment during exploitation is calculated exogenously. This employ-
ment constitutes the input for the model. Thus total wages are calcula-
ted endogenously using the country specific wage sum in the model. All 
these annual costs (in constant prices) increase and cumulate gradually 
from 1988 to 1993 and stabilise from 1994 to 1997. 
3.5. Evaluation of the suitability after 
modification 
INTERLINK country models take account of the following macroeconomic 
impact of pollution control. 
In the expenditure block the different categories of demand are model-
led. Traditional consumption declines if costs of pollution control for 
consumers rise. More indirectly consumption is affected by changes in 
the national income. 
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Gross business investments (exclusive of environmental investments) are 
influenced through rising pollution control costs and decreasing profi-
tability as well as by changes in national income and interest rates. 
Additional import is generated due to the environmental investments and 
operating costs as well as increasing national income. 
In the wage and price block changes in wage and price levels are caus-
ally related to other factors such as environmental costs. Increasing 
pollution control costs are partially reflected in rising prices for 
final demand categories. Moreover, through wage indexation, these price 
changes might be reflected in wage changes which may result in price 
changes, etc. 
The social security and government block describes the most important 
allowances and contributions. Financing of pollution control invest-
ments affects the government budget deficit. Tax revenues, as well as 
lower allowances, resulting from additional expenditures and employment 
counterbalance this. 
In the block of capital transactions and trade the environmental 
investment and costs cause world trade volume to rise. Relative export 
prices of the different EC countries change as well as a result of 
foreign and domestic pollution cohtrol costs, resulting in an altera-
tion of the export position. Existing patterns of trade are thus 
modified. 
In addition to these incorporated macroeconomic impacts two other 
transmission mechanisms might be relevant. However, these are not 
incorporated in the simulations that have been made with INTERLINK: 
1. The environmental investment may cause a direct crowding out of 
traditional business investments due to limited financial means. 
2. A decrease in business profit may, in case it arises, speed up 
the scrapping of old capital vintages (and complementary labour). 
This may happen in putty clay models, but the INTERLINK supply 
model of the large countries is of a putty/semi-putty type. 
It is concluded that INTERLINK is in principle a suitable model for 
studying international economic aspects of national control strategies 
to reduce acidifying emissions in the EC. INTERLINK involves consider-
able detail for individual countries. This gives a richer set of 
results but implies a larger and more considered data input. The models 
for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom are more detailed 
than those for other EC-countries. 
3.6. Conclusions 
In this project the OECD INTERLINK model was selected to simulate the 
macroeconomic impact of pollution control. The model was selected since 
its quality is high, the model is 'up to date', operational, trans-
parant and cost effective. After modification of the EC country models 
INTERLINK was able to capture almost all relevant macroeconomic impacts 
of national control strategies to reduce acidifying emissions in the 
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EC. Only the impacts of direct 'crowding-out' of traditional invest-
ments and of additional scrapping were not incorporated. Adaptation of 
the country models was necessary in order to take the specific charac-
teristics of pollution control into account. In spite of a high degree 
of structural similarity, country models were more detailed for larger 
than for smaller EC countries, which necessitated different modificat-
ions. Also the pollution control investments and costs as endogeneously 
determined had to be converted to constitute as inputdata for INTER-
LINK. 
•• 
21 
4. DIRECTIVE AND ABATEMENT STRATEGIES 
4.1. Introducti~n 
The strategies EC countries adopt to meet the Directive on large com-
bustion plants are the subject of this chapter. 
First a brief description is given of the Directive and its main com-
ponents (section 4.2) viz.: 
- emission standards for new, large combustion plants; 
prescription of percentages reduction in the total emissions of 
large combustion plants ( overall emission target or bubble con-
cept) per country. 
Secondly a projection of unabated, reference emissions in 1995 is com-
pared with the overall emission targets (section 4.3) to determine 
which amount of emissions should be abated to meet the percentage re-
duction required in the Directive. Subsequently the question on the 
abatement strategy in each country is tackled (section 4.4) as fol-
lows: 
- Some countries have already national legislation to control emis-
sions. If this legislated national policy is sufficient to meet 
the Directive this national policy is taken to calculate costs. 
- In the absence of a national control strategy, or if the national 
strategy does not lead (fully) to the emission targets, (addition-
al) abatement measures are needed. Countries without national 
strategies must first comply with the emission standards for new, 
large (power) plants. If that is not sufficient to meet the bubble 
concept existing power plants are to take abatement measures or 
new plants need to take more stringent measures. 
The conclusions are presented in section 4.5. 
The following limitations should be noted. Costs are calculated only 
for the period 1985-1995 (stage one of the Directive) since it was 
technically impossible to simulate the macroeconomic impact of the se-
cond stage (period 1995-2000) of the Directive. 
The amount of emissions to be abated under the bubble concept includes 
emissions from large power stations as well as large industrial plants. 
However, no assesment was feasible of the technical abatement measures 
and emission reduction for new industrial plants due to a lack of data 
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on the size distribution of these plants 1 ). One should note however 
that the emissions from large industrial plants (as well as large power 
plants) are abated; not by means of abatement measures on new indus-
trial plants, but by additional measures on existing or new power 
plants. The possible error introduced by this procedure is discussed in 
the next chapter (section 5.4). 
4.2. The directive on large combustion plants 
The Commission of the European Community, at the end of 1983, has pro-
posed a Directive to limit the S0 2 and NOx emissions from large com-
bustion plants. This draft Council Directive applies to combustion 
plants with a heat input of more than 50 MWth. The original Directive 
contains two components: 
1) New plants (for which an operating license is granted after 1st 
January 1985) have to comply with emission standards. These emis-
sion standards depend on the size of the installation ( > 300 
MWth, 100-300 MWth and< 100 MWth). 
2) A bubble concept according to which member states are to draw up 
programmes for the reduction of total annual emissions from large 
combustion plants. This in order to reach by 31st December 1995 
at the latest the following overall reductions of emissions from 
large combustion plants (using 1980 as a base year): 
60% for S0 2 
40% for NOx 
Presently within the Council discussions are still taking place on the 
contents of the Directive. This discussion did not yet result in a fi-
nal solution. Therefore for the purpose of this study the following 
assumptions have been made, reflecting discussions in late 1986: 
* the emission standards proposed for the first stage (1985-1995) 
are the same as in the original proposal. 
* in 1995 each EC country, as well as the EC as a whole, is to reach 
in principle a minimum reduction of 45% for S0 2 and 30% for 
NOx· 
* the following exceptions are made: 
With respect to S0 2 : Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg are allowed to 
maintain emissions at the 1980 level (a standstill). Portugal is 
allowed an increase. Spain should reduce its emissions by at least 
10%. 
Regarding NOx: Ireland, Luxembourg as well as Portugal are to 
maintain their emissions at the 1980 level. Spain is to reduce 
emissions by 10%. Greece is allowed to increase its NOx emis-
sions. 
1 Only for the present abatement policies of Denmark, the Federal Repu-
blic of Germany and The Netherlands data allowed a estimate of their 
emission standards for industrial plants. 
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4.3. Future emissions (reference case) 
4.3.1. Introduction 
Future emissions, percentage reduction and emissions of large combus-
tion installations in 1980 determine to a large extent the costs of the 
Directive for each country. To project future (reference) emissions an 
emissions submodule was set up. Input data for this module are: 
* scenarios for fuel use in industry and electricity generation in 
1995. 
* data on emission factors for sulphur dioxyde, depending on heat 
value, sulphur retained in ash and sulphur content. 
* data on emission factors for NOx. 
* data on 1980 emissions for large combustion plants. 
The emissions submodule results in a projection of 1995 emissions of 
large combustions plants and an estimation of emissions to be abated to 
meet the bubble part of the Directive. 
4.3.2. Energy consumption 
In this study the energy use in electricity generation for 1995 was 
based on UNIPEDE (1987) and energy use in industrial plants was based 
on CEC projections as put forward in the "Energy 2000" study (Guilmot 
et. al., 1986) and IEA (1986) for Spain and Portugal. Table 1 summa-
rises some of the characteristics of this energy scenario. 
Table 1. Characteristics of the energy scenario for 1995 
Power Plants Industry 
Electricity Electricity Shares(%): Fuel consumption 
consumption production non- oil coal Index Total 
Country (1980=100) (Twh) fossil (1980=100)(PJ) 
Belgium 140 67.5 61 9 26 85 480 
Denmark 163 35.7 2 0 98 127 154 
France 177 490.0 94 1 4 80 1475 
Germany 128 446.0 40 3 50 81 2295 
Greece 190 41.3 17 8 75 140 209 
Ireland 183 18.1 6 37 57 150 109 
Italy 161 272.3 18 25 37 92 1377 
Luxembourg 134 1.0 58 0 0 94 82 
Netherlands 117 66.7 5 0 48 104 641 
Portugal 203 31.4 40 14 46 176 205 
Spain 162 169.6 55 5 40 167 1001 
U.K. 117 305.6 23 3 74 102 1833 
Note: non-fossil include hydro and nuclear; total of shares may differ 
from 100% since gas is not included. 
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In view of recent information the share of oil in industrial energy 
demand, and related S0 2 emissions, might be somewhat higher as expected 
in the 'Energy 2000' study2 ). The energy scenario used for electricity 
generation tends to overestimate the expected growth in electicity de-
mand as well as the share of oil and solid fuels. This implies an over-
estimate of future emissions certainly of S0 2 • 
It must be noted that for several countries there are major uncertain-
ties in the future of nuclear energy and the penetration of coal 3 ). 
4.3.3. Emission coefficients 
Sulphur emission coefficients were based on various international and 
national sources: (Amann et. al, 1986; CEC, 1984; de Ryck, 1983; De-
partment of the environment, 1986; Beck, 1986; CITEPA, 1983; Schultz, 
1986). 
For nitrogen oxides emissions, available information allowed only an 
aggregated approach: no distinction was possible of different types of 
combustion installations. Emission factors only differ per fuel type 
and per sector. A large share of data was based on CITEPA (1986), sup-
plemented with various national sources (Hoogervorst,1985; Department 
of the Environment; CITEPA, 1983; Beck, 1986; CEC; 1984). Technical 
document I (section 3) supplies more details on these data. 
4.3.4. so2 emissions to be abated 
to meet the bubble 
The energy scenario in combination with the emission coefficients lead 
to a projection of unabated, reference emissions of large combustion 
plants in 1995 (see table 2). The amount of emissions to be abated re-
sults from the percentage reduction required and the reference emis-
sions. Table 2 does not yet incorporate the impact of already legis-
lated national control strategies in several EC countries. National 
control strategies are discussed in section 4.4. 
2 In view of recent oil price developments the 'Energy 2000' study 
(Guilmot, 1986), used for the projection of industrial emissions is 
probably based on a too high oil price. Recent scenario's indicate a 
lower oil price, which stimulates economic growth and energy demand 
in the EC, and moreover reduces the interest of industry in energy 
conservation (CEC, 1986). Against that however slower growth rates 
for the iron and steel industry and more rapid change towards higher 
value added products in combination with ongoing improvements in the 
chemical, paper- and pulp industry counterbalance this. As a result 
the projection of future industrial energy demand is hardly affected 
although the share of oil will be somewhat higher at the expense of 
natural gas and oil. 
3 Especially in the case of Italy the near energy future seems unpre-
dictable due to siting problems of coal fired power plants and dis-
cussions on the extension of nuclaer capacity. (ENEA, 1987.) 
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Differences in emissions to be abated per country resulting from dif-
ferences in reference emissions can be explained as follows. 
In Belgium some reduction in emissions is expected due to an increased 
share of nuclear and low sulpur coal in the production of electricity. 
However, the reduction is not sufficient, since industrial emissions 
will decrease only slightly and high sulphur fuel oil will continue to 
be used in power plants. 
Without a national control strategy emissions in Denmark would increase 
with the growth in electricity consumption. This growth will be met by 
increased coal use in power plants. Industrial emissions tend to stabi-
lise. 
In France growth in nuclear power and a shift away from high sulphur 
oil cause S0 2 emissions to decrease enough to meet the bubble. Apart 
from measures on new industrial plants France does not need to take 
action. 
Table 2. S0 2 emissions to be abated in 1995 
Emissions 
1980 
Country (kton) 
Belgium 530 
Denmark 323 
France 1910 
Germany 2225 
Greece 250 
Ireland 99 
Italy 2450 
Luxembourg 3 
Netherlands 299 
Portugal 280 
Spain 2290 
United Kingdom 3600 
EEC 14259 
Reference 
(unabated) 
1995 
(kton) 
359 
365 
782 
2277 
273 
163 
2101 
0 
324 
360 
2243 
3324 
12571 
EEC 
target 
1995 
(%) 
45 
45 
45 
45 
0 
0 
45 
0 
45 
0* 
10 
45 
<45 
EEC 
target 
1995 
(kton) 
292 
178 
1051 
1224 
250 
99 
1348 
3 
164 
360 
2061 
1980 
7842 
To be abated 
1995 
(kton) 
67 
187 
0 
1053 
23 
64 
753 
0 
159 
0 
182 
1344 
4792 
Note: National abatement policies are not included in reference emis-
sions. 1980 emissions based on country submissions to the EEC 
(CEC, 1987). Reference emissions based on the emissions model 
except Greece and Portugal based on CEC submissions. 
*:granted an increase. 
Emissions from electricity generation in the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny tend to stabilise, even if Germany's legislated abatement policy is 
not considered. The growth in electricity demand is met by nuclear and 
_______ C _______ c---- c ------------C-
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coal-fired capacity at the expense of oil. Industrial emissions tend to 
decline since final energy demand drops and the share of hard coal and 
gas grows. 
In Greece S0 2 emissions increase only slightly, despite the doubling of 
electricity demand and consequent tripling of the use of domestic brown 
coal with a very high S0 2 emission. This is due to the high calcium 
content in the Northern Greece brown coal which leads to a higher sul-
phur retention is ash 4 ). Without additional costs, Greece can comply 
with the emission standards for most of its new plants. 
In Ireland the growth in emissions is mainly caused by the increase in 
coal for electricity generation while the use of high sulphur fuel oil 
stabilises. 
In Italy S0 2 pollution decreases as a result of a shift from high sul-
phur oil to low sulphur coal and nuclear energy for electricity genera-
tion. Moreover a reduction in the use of fuel oil causes industrial 
emissions to decline as well. 
In the Netherlands power plants emissions would stabilise as the in-
crease of coal emissions is offset by a decrease in fuel oil and an 
increase in natural gas. Industrial emissions increase slightly. 
In Portugal sulphur emissions are' raised since the rapid increase in 
electricity demand is met by new coal-fired capacity. Although indus-
trial emissions grow as well, Portugal does not need to take abatement 
measures to meet the bubble since it is permitted an increase. 
In Spain power plants emissions decrease due to the decrease in use of 
high sulphur fuel oil and stabilisation in use of brown coal. Industri-
al emissions however almost double. 
In the United Kingdom emissions show a downward trend; the industrial 
use of fuel oil declines in favour of hard coal and natural gas. 
4.3.5. HOx emissions to be abated 
to meet the bubble 
Table 3 shows the amount of NOx emissions that needs abatement in 
order to comply with the bubble concept. 
One should note that compared to the data on S0 2 emissions for large 
combustion plants, NOx emissions for 1980 are less well accepted, 
both politically and sci8ntifically5 ). The same holds for the projec-
tion of future emissions due to the less firm database of NOx emis-
sion factors. The level of reference emissions can be explained as fol-
lows. 
4 That is to say if appropriate steps are taken to reduce these emis-
sions during combustion 
5 For Italy for example the 1980 emissions refer to all emissions from 
all power and industrial plants irrespective of the size. This 
implies an overestimate of the required reduction. 
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Table 3. NOx emissions to be abated in 1995 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
EEC 
Emissions 
1980 
(kton) 
136 
124 
368 
1062 
24 
24 
649 
1 
110 
23 
450 
954 
3925 
Unabated 
Reference 
1995 
(kton) 
115 
165 
190 
925 
38 
44 
913 
1 
128 
85 
500 
1006 
4110· 
EEC 
target 
1995 
(%) 
30 
30 
30 
30 
0* 
0 
30 
0 
30 
0 
10 
30 
< 30 
EEC 
target 
1995 
(kton) 
95 
87 
258 
743 
38 
24 
454 
1 
77 
23 
405 
668 
2748 
To be abated 
1995 
(kton) 
20 
78 
0 
182 
0 
20 
459 
0 
51 
62 
95 
338 
1363 
Note: National abatement policies are not included in reference emis-
sions based on the emissions submodel. 1980 emissions based on 
emission inventory (CEC, 1987), not confirmed by memberstates. 
* granted an increase. 
In Belgium the reduction in NOx pollution, resulting mainly from the 
use of nuclear power is not sufficient to meet the bubble. In France 
the growing share of nuclear capacity causes a sharp decrease and 
additional abatement measures are not needed. Denmark must take steps 
due to the growing share of coal fired capacity. In Germany, even 
without national abatement strategy, NOx emissions are expected to 
decline since fuel use is decreasing in industry and in electricity 
generation. 
In Greece NOx pollution increases sharply due to the increase in 
brown coal use and despite the very low emission factor. No reduction 
however is required since NOx emissions per ton fuel combusted are 
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already very low (100 gr/GJ). Additional reduction would imply after 
treatment of the flue gases at prohibitive costs per ton emission abat-
ed. 
In Ireland emissions will double as a result of new coal fired power 
plants coming on stream. Italian NOx pollution enlarges rapidly as a 
result of the increased use of coal for electricity production. In 
Luxembourg these emissions stabilise. In the Netherlands they would 
increase: the increasing use of coal being responsible. In Portugal the 
expected increase stems mainly from the incline in coal use for elec-
tricity generation. 
In Spain this type of pollution remains at the 1980 level for power 
plants. However industrial emissions rise, making abatement measures 
inevitable. 
In the United Kingdom NOx pollution will nearly stay at the same 
level due to the stabilisation of. fuel use in electricity generation as 
well as in industry. 
4.4. Control strategy and abatement 
measures per country 
4.4.1. Introduction 
This section describes the assumed reaction of the various EC Countries 
on the proposed Directive. 
4.4.2. Sulphur dioxide 
Conn tries with a national control policy: Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands 
Denmark, implementing its own policy, reduces its emissions by means of 
an extensive program of applying FGD (flue gas desulphurization) on new 
and existing power plants. In addition the sulphur content in fuel oil 
is reduced from 1.5% to 1.0% S. and the sulphur content in hard coal is 
limited to 1.2%. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany an intensive program of FGD on new 
as well as existing plants has and will result from the Ordinance on 
large firing installations. Part of the emission standards set fort in 
the Ordinance can be met by the use of low sulphur fuels. Costs esti-
mates for the use of these fuels however were not included since the 
volume of these low sulphur fuels was not available. 
In the Netherlands a comparable ordinance came into force in spring 
1987 and incorporates earlier legislation. All new and existing 
coal-fired plants (> 300 MWth), with some exceptions, require FGD. For 
other, existing coal-fired power plants, 0.8% S in coal is required. 
Industrial standards can be met by the use of fuel oil with a sulphur 
content of 1.0%, in existing as well as new installations, or the 
application of fluidised bed combustion for new coal fired installat-
ions. Special standards for refineries are to be met by combining 
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a reduction in process emissions and, if necessary flue gas desulphuri-
zation. 
These three countries do more then meet the bubble (see technical docu-
ment I for details.) 
France, Luxembourg and Portugal 
France has no costs due to its large share of nuclear energy. Sulphur 
emissions in Luxembourg, already negligible, would decrease anyway mak-
ing abatement measures superfluous. Portugal is granted an increase in 
its emissions and can confine with the use of free, low sulphur coal up 
to 1995. All these countries meet the Directive without measures. 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom 
The most likely strategy of these countries are not known. Therefore 
the following strategies were assumed. 
Belgium installs FGD on some recently commissioned coal-fired plants 
and in addition some existing oil-fired units. A new fluidised bed com-
bustion unit will inject additional lime. 
Greece can confine with the application of sorbent injection instead of 
FGD on one new brown coal power plant. The need for abatement is al-
ready low due to the expected reduction of emissions during combustion 
of most new brown coal-fired plants. 
In Ireland all new or recently commissioned coal-fired units and more-
over a small oil-fired unit apply FGD to reach the standstill require-
ment. 
All new Italian fossil fueled power plants apply FGD. This is still not 
enough to reach the 45% reduction. In addition FGD is installed on part 
of the existing capacity. 
Spain installs FGD on all new coal-fired plants and one existing coal 
plant to comply with the 10% reduction of the bubble. 
In the United Kingdom some 23000 MWe, of which more then 19000 MWe in-
volves retrofitting, would need FGD to meet the 45% reduction. 
4.4.3. Nitrogen oxides 
Countries with a legislated national policy: Germany and the Nether-
lands 
In Germany the Conference of Federal and State Environment ministers 
accepted stringent emission standards for NOx· As a result new and 
part of the existing large (>300 MWth) plants in electricity generation 
as well as in industry, have to install SCR (Selective Calatytic Reduc-
tion). Other plants are expected to instal CM (Combustion Modifica-
tion). Although data on the extent of the abatement program are less 
certain for NOx than for S0 2 an estimate was possible (see technical 
document I, for details). 
The Netherlands policy is less strict. New coal fired units can imple-
ment TSC (Two stage combustion). Converted unit as well as some new gas 
fired units will apply CM. Furthermore an extensive program of retro-
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fitting gas-fired power plants with CM is expected. CM and fluidised 
bed combustion is expected for industrial installations to meet the 
overall reduction of the Directive. In view of available information 
(see technical document I) the conclusion is warranted that the present 
Dutch policy is not sufficient. Therefore extra CM on some existing 
plants is assumed. 
Remaining countries 
These countries start with CM to meet the emission standards for their 
new power plants. If this is insuffiecient to meet the bubble extra 
measures are taken in the most cost effective way. 
Belgium installs TSC on some recently commissioned coal plants. In ad-
dition some existing units use CM and one fluidised bed plant will also 
contribute to the Belgium efforts. In Denmark all recently converted or 
new coal-fired plants need TSC or CM. Moreover three-quarters of the 
existing coal capacity needs CM as well to meet the bubble. In Ireland 
all coal-fired Moneypoint units need TSC. Also retrofitting of all 
brown coal and part of oil fired capacity with CM is needed. Spain can 
sustain with the application of TSC on its new coal fired plants and CM 
on ~ small part of existing capacity. For all these countries efforts 
and costs are small. 
The United Kingdom needs a more stringent program. Despite the stabili-
sation of NOx emissions the 30% reduction requires an intensive pro-
gram of retrofitting 95% of the existing coal-fired capacity and TSC on 
all new coal-fired units. 
For Italy and Portugal however TSC and CM is not enough and SCR is in-
evitable. Italy has to equip practically all its new coal- and oil-
fired power plants with SCR, except for some coal units that have to 
apply only TSC. Moreover all existing oil, gas and coal fired units 
would require CM. Portugal applies CM on the existing plants followed 
by, a least-cost-combination of SCR and TSC on all new or recently 
built coal-fired power plants. 
4.5. Conclusions 
Sulphur dioxide 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands carry out 
their already legislated national control strategies and do more then 
meet the bubble. France, Luxembourg and Portugal do not have to take 
abatement measures. The most likely abatement strategy of Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom is not known. 
Therefore it was assumed that these countries generally will install 
flue gas desulphurization on new power plants and, if unsufficient to 
meet the bubble, apply FGD on existing power plants. 
Nitrogen oxides 
The Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands will carry out 
their own legislated policy. For the Netherlands this is insufficient 
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and additional combustion modification is expected. France and Luxem-
bourg are not to take any measures and neither is Greece since it is 
granted an increase in its emissions. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom start with combustion modifica-
tions to meet the emission standards for their new power plants. If 
insufficient additional measures are taken in the most cost-effective 
way, selecting between two stage combustion, combustion modification on 
existing power plants and, if inevitable selective catalytic reduc-
tion. 
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5. COSTS AHD IHVESTMEHTS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the costs and investments of the abatement 
strategy in each country. 
Section 5.2 presents the structure and major elements of the costs mo-
dule used to calculate abatement costs. This costs module describes the 
different abatement technologies, their costs as well as the country 
specific and generic elements taken into account to calculate the costs 
for each country. The results of this calculation method gre presented 
in section 5.3. The same section not only includes the absolute size of 
the pollution control investments and costs, but also depicts and des-
cribes the efforts as percentage of the gross domestic product and the 
impact on electricity prices. A discussion on sensitivity is the sub-
ject of section 5.4. Conclusions are made in section 5.5. 
5.2. Costs submodule 
5.2.1. Introduction 
This submodule calculates the costs and investments of the abatament 
strategy of each country. It takes into account country specific as 
well as generic factors that influence the cost and investments of the 
abatement of sulphur dioxyde and nitrogen oxides emissions. Table 4 
shows its main features. 
The possibility to incorporate country-specific data on detailed fuel 
characteristics and on the capacity of plants is an important characte-
ristic of the module 1 ). The United Kingdom for example uses a domestic 
hard coal with a high chlorine content which leads to additional in-
vestments before flue gas desulphurization of power plants can take 
place. 
1 Through incorporating fuel characteristics such as heat value, sul-
phur content, S0 2 retention in ash and specific fluegas volumes a 
more accurate calculation of abatement costs is possible. Size and 
age of plants are important when it comes to assessing the costs spe-
cific limit values for S0 2 and NOx in fluegas. 
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Table 4. Input and output of the costs module 
INPUT 
Country specific data 
* Emissions to abate 
* National abatement strategy 
* Type and specifications of fuel 
* Capacity of combustion plants 
(size, new, existing) 
* Interest rate 
* Operating hours 
* Energy efficiency plant 
* Electricity price 
OUTPUT 
* Investments 
Generic data 
* Relation size and investment 
for a specific abatement 
technique 
* Life-time new, existing 
* Fixed operating cost (% of 
investment) 
* Wagesum per man year 
* Direct employment during 
exploitation 
*Prices of lime(stone), water, 
ammonia and catalyst 
* Capital costs (interest and deprecation) 
* Operating costs (fixed, materials, energy and wages) 
* Employment during exploitation 
* Emissions abated 
A basic assumption of the costs module is that costs related to a spe-
cific abatement technique, taking into account only generic data, are 
in principle equal for each EC country. Costs however will differ be-
tween countries due to differences in country specific factors such as 
size, fuel type, interest rate and electricity price. The existence of 
a free accesible market for abatement technologies and know-how tends, 
on the long run, to minimise diff~rences in costs, for a specific tech-
nology, which are due to generic factors. According to this principle 
e.g. the investment in a new 300 MWE unit burning imported hard coal 
with the same sulphur content will be the same in Ireland, Portugal or 
Germany. Data on investments and costs are mainly based on German data 
since these data are based on large scale, relevant Western European 
experience. 
The costs module consists of two submodules: 
- sulphur dioxyde 
- nitrogen oxides 
For more details reference is made to technical document I. 
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5.2.2. Sulphur dioxide control options 
The techniques for S0 2 emission control which have been considered are: 
- Flue gas desulphurization (FGD) (gypsum processes) 
- Fluidized Bed Combustion (FBC) 
- Dry Sorbent Injection (DSI) 
-Use of low sulphur coal (0.60-0.7S %S) 
- Use of low sulphur heavy fuel oil (O.S-1.0 %S) 
Table S summarises the control possibilities and gives an impression of 
the costs presently derived from the costs module. 
Table S. S0 2 control options: costs and removal efficiencies 
Control option 
* flue gas 
desulphurization 
* low sulphur coal 
* low sulphur heavy 
fuel oil 
* fluidised 
bed combustion 
* sorbent injection 
Investment 
(ECU/KWe) 
74-226 * 
0 
0 
0 
103 * 
Annual costs Removal 
(ECU/ton S0 2 ) efficiency 
340- 960 * 90% 
0 II 
400-1120 II 
0 S0-70% 
0 
96S * SO% 
* Resulting costs depend on generic and country specific factors 
II Depends on reference case. 
Technical document I (section 2) contains further details. 
Use of low sulphur fuels is a straightforward way to achieve abatement. 
The emission standards for large (>300 MWth) plants however can not be 
met. Coal with the necessary very low sulphur content is not available, 
while the costs of very low sulphur fuel oil (< 0.1 %) are prohibitive 
compared with those of other abatement techniques. 
In the case of oil combustion, emission standards of plants with capa-
cities in the range of <100 MWth and 100-300 MWth can be met using oil 
with a sulphur content of 1.1 %. Costs depend on the initial sulphur 
content. For economic reasons, fuel oils are used with sulphur contents 
up to 3.S % at present within the EC. 
Coal with a sufficiently low sulphur content (some 0.7%) for use in 
smaller plants, is available on the world market with little sulphur 
premium (Sulphur premium: extra costs of fuel oil per percent sulphur). 
However, coal use is often connected with local reserves which will 
continue, thus prohibiting use of imported low sulphur coal. 
Dry sorbent injection, a recently developed technique, refers to the 
injection of cheap so2 absorbing chemicals (limestone, lime) into the 
furnace. The efficiency of the process is around SO %. Investments are 
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relatively low, while operating costs are high compared with FGD, a 
well known alternative. 
Fluidized bed combustion (FBC) is a new, not yet fully developed com-
bustion technique. From an air pollution point of view it is attractive 
since it is a cheap alternative for abating S0 2 emissions and at the 
same time NOx emissions. At this moment it is only used in smaller 
(<300 MWth) plants. It is not considered as an important technique for 
large scale power production in the coming decade (this applies as well 
to all other techniques, as for instance integrated coal gassification 
gasturbine systems). 
The proposed emission standards in the EC-directive for large plants (> 
300 MWth) therefore can only be met by using FGD: flue gas desulphu-
rization. In the use of this technique a considerable experience, es-
pecially in Germany, exists. German data have been used to construct a 
mathematical relation between investment and: 
* size (MWe) 
* sulphur content (% S) 
* specific fluegas volume (m3/Kwh) 
Next, equations were constructed for the annual costs: 
*Capital costs (depreciation and interest) 2 ) 
* Exploitation costs: 
Fixed: tax, insurance, administration, maintenance and repair 
- Variable: materials (limestone, water), electricity and 
wages 
It is concluded that in the period up to 1995 new large (>300 MWth) 
plants will be fitted with FGD installations in order to meet the EC-
directive. Smaller plants (100-300 MWth) are preferably fitted with dry 
sorbent injection (if nessecary) because of too high sulphur contents 
of the fuel which makes FGD more expensive. 
5.2.3. Nitrogen oxides control options 
The technologies considered are: 
- Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) 
- Combustion Modification (CM) 
- Two Stage Combustion (TSC) 3) 
- Fluidised Bed Combustion (FBC) 
Some key information is given in Table 6. 
2 ) Capital costs are calculated with country specific market interest 
rates and the generic economic lifetime of new and existing plants. 
This approach might differ from depreciation schemes and internal 
interest rates used by national electricity producers. 
3 ) An important subcategory of combustion modification. 
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Selective Catalytic Reduction removes nitrogen oxides from fluegas: 
ammonia reacts with NOx producing nitrogen and water. A catalyst is 
needed. Practical removal efficiency is ca 80 %. 
Table 6. NOx control options: costs and removal efficiencies. 
Technique Investment annual costs efficiency Remarks 
(ECU/KWe) (ECU/ton NOx) % 
SCR 22-33 1000-1400 80 Large > 300 
MWth plants 
CM 4- 8 28- 30 20-40 Retrofit 
possible 
TSC S-10 so- 70 30-60 
FBC 0 0 so 
Combustion Modification optimizes the boiler operation to reduce the 
NOx production. Parameters are operational (rates of air and fuel 
flows, mixing of combustion air with fuel etc.) as well as technical 
(burner design etc.). Some types of CM are useful in retrofit situa-
tions: Low NOx Burners. 
Two stage combustion is one of the older techniques for NOx control. 
It is based on the principle of fuel rich burner operation achieved by 
inserting portions of the combustion air through separate ports. The 
technique is especially suited for (new), large, coal-fired installa-
tions. 
Fluidized Bed Combustion of solid fuels is a combustion technique with 
several advantages, one being a relatively low NOx production. 
The operational costs of combustion modification techniques are nihil 
or low compared with those of SCR. Costs are only capital costs. 
Ammonia and the catalyst needed to operate SCR lead to operational 
costs which form the majority of total annual costs. In the cost module 
German data was used in a relationship between investment in SCR, the 
size of the plant and the type of fuel (solid, oil, gas). Furthermore 
equations were developed for the different annual costs viz: 
* capital costs (interest and depriciation) 
* operating costs: 
fixed: tax, insurance, adm~nistration, maintenance and repair 
- variable: materials (catalyst and ammonia)and energy 
costs (electricity and steam) 
Compared to the data on costs for controlling S0 2 emissions data to 
control NOx emissions are generally less well established. 
In practice a combination of techniques is used in new plants to mini-
mize or evade the use of SCR in complying with emission standards. SCR 
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will then only be used in plants with a capacity larger than 300 MWth 
if this is inevitable to meet stricter national standards (Germany) or 
to comply with the bubble concept. 
5.3. Costs and investments 
5.3.1. Introduction 
The costs of the Directive for most countries are to a large extent 
determined by the requirement of the bubble; the emission standards for 
new power plants only would demand less efforts 4 ). 
But there are some exceptions. Several countries, Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands carry out their own national 
control policies. Other countries, France and Luxembourg, for example 
do not need to abate emissions at all. In this section first costs and 
investments of the control of S0 2 emissions are presented. Subsequently 
the costs and investments of abatement measures for NOx are presen-
ted. 
5.3.2. Sulphurdioxide 
Absolute level of costs and investments 
Table 7 summarizes the measures, costs, investments and emission reduc-
tion for those countries that are to take measures to meet the Direct-
ive. The annual costs are the final level of cost in 1995. The final 
level of costs results from the amount of emission abated .and the (ave-
rage) costs per ton abated. The amount of emissions to abate was ex-
plained in the previous chapter (Future emissions: reference case). 
Differences in costs per ton (see also table 8) can be explained as 
follows. 
Compared to the EC average, costs per ton avoided are high in Belgium 
due to the small size of the coal-fired units, as well as the low ope-
rating hours and restricted lifetime of the oil fired plants. 
Danish costs per ton abated are relatively low. Some 25% of the abate-
ment is reached by low sulphur fuel oil (400 ECU/ton); the size (± 400 
MWe) and operating hours of the coal fired units that use flue gas de-
sulphurization are high. 
Costs per ton of the German policy are slighty higher due to its large 
program of retrofitting power plants. 
Despite the high operating costs of sorbent injection in Greece the 
very low capital costs of this technique result in low costs per ton 
4 ) Probably also for all new plants (including industrial installa-
tions). We remind the reader that no estimate was made for the 
abatement measures and costs of meeting the emission standards for 
new industrial plants. 
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Table 7. Measures, investments, costs and emission reduction for S0 2 (figures in million ECU of 1985). 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Greece 
Germany// 
Ireland 
Italy 
Nether-
lands 
Spain 
United 
Kingdom 
note: FGD: 
FBC: 
II 
Measure Size Investments Annual 
(MWe) (1985-1995) 
FBC + lime 105 
FGD existing 1540 
TOTAL 1645 
FGD new 928 
FGD existing 3147 
1% S fuel oil 
1.2%S in coal 
TOTAL 
S.I.new 
FGD new 
FGD existing 
FGD industry 
TOTAL 
FGD new 
FGD existing 
TOTAL 
4075 
300 
16186 
19447 
6267 
41900 
276 
953 
1229 
FGD new 15280 
FGD existing 5298 
TOTAL 20578 
FGD new 
FGD existing 
FGD industry 
0.8% S in coal 
1.0% S fuel oil 
TOTAL 
1800 
2681 
720 
5201 
FGD new 2529 
FGD existing 2122 
TOTAL 4651 
FGD new 3552 
FGD existing 19450 
TOTAL 23002 
0 
238 
238 
143 
292 
0 
0 
436 
311 
1567 
2623 
580 
4770 
29 
139 
168 
1175 
1144 
2319 
152 
332 
148 
0 
0 
633 
261 
239 
500 
439 
2721 
3160 
costs 
(1995) 
0.5 
45.5 
45.9 
28.3 
55.3 
19.5 
0 
103.1 
0.9 
306.8 
532.6 
133.2 
972.6 
7.1 
32.5 
39.6 
224.6 
214.2 
438.9 
29.6 
59.0 
34.0 
0 
5.5 
128.2 
48.2 
44.3 
92.5 
79.9 
548.1 
628.0 
Emission 
reduction 
(Kton) 
3 
64 
67 
55 
95 
44 
2 
201 
25 
733 
737 
247 
1716 
13 
51 
64 
389 
364 
753 
67 
100 
53 
23 
14 
256 
104 
77 
180 
201 
1143 
1344 
flue gas desulphurization, S.I.: sorbent injection, 
fluidised bed combustion. 
Measures before 1985 excluded. If the were included annual 
costs would be 1180 million ECU/annum and investments up to 
1995 amount to 5.8. billion ECU. 
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avoided. 
In Ireland costs per ton are high since most of the plants need retro-
fitting. This, the high interest rate and the high electricity price 
explain the relatively high capital and operating costs per ton 
abated. 
Although capital cost per ton abated are relatively low in Italy, since 
most of the plants are new, operating costs per ton avoided are high 
due to the low sulphur content. 
The cost per ton abated for the Netherlands are somewhat below EC ave-
rage. This is mainly due to the large size (600 MWe) of new planned 
coal fired units and the use of cheap low sulphur fuels, despite the 
higher costs of FGD in refineries and some converted coal fired power 
plants. In spite of the higher investment, due to the high chlorine 
content in the British coal and retrofitting, costs per ton S0 2 avoided 
are below EC average. The main explanation is the relatively large size 
of the units (some 600 MWe). In addition the high sulphur content in 
the coal involves a large amount of emission abated per FGD unit 
leading to low costs per ton abated. 
Table 8. Investments and costs of reducing S0 2 emissions (in million 
ECU's in 1985 prices) 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
FRGermany''c 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal -1n-, 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
EEC 
Investments 
(1985-1995) 
238 
436 
0 
4769 
31 
168 
2319 
0 
633 
0 
500 
3160 
12253 
Annual 
costs 
(1995) 
45.9 
94.6 
0 
976.6 
10.9 
39.6 
438.9 
0 
128.2 
0 
92.5 
628.0 
2455 
* excluding measures taken before 1985 
Emission Costs per 
abated ton abated 
(kton) (ECU/ton) 
67 685 
201 471 
0 0 
1716 569 
25 436 
64 619 
753 583 
0 0 
256 501 
0 0 
180 514 
1344 467 
4606 533 
** For Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands figures refer to their na-
tional control policy. These countries do more then meet the 
bubble. 
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Costs as percentage of the gross domestic product 
Figure 3 depicts the total annual abatement costs in 1995 as percentage 
of the Gross Domestic Product in each country. Although crude it per-
mits some analyses of the differences in macroeconomic impact for each 
country. 
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Figure 3. S0 2 abatement costs in 1995 (in constant prices of 1985) as 
percentage of the 1985 gross domestic product (GOP). 
Average annual costs in the EC are not very high (0.074% of unweighted 
GOP in 1985) compared to the total environmental expenditures in some 
European countries which are in the range of 0.5 - 1.7% of GOP (OECD, 
1984). Striking, compared to the EC average, are the high costs in Ger-
many, Denmark and Ireland. In Denmark as well as in Germany this is due 
to their own stringent policy. If measures effectuated in Germany be-
fore 1985 are taken into account costs are even higher (0.14% instead 
of 0.12% of GDP). The costs for Ireland are high because their GDP is 
low and abatement costs are high with their increase in coal-related 
sulphur emissions. 
Costs are high in the United Kingdom mainly as a result of the required 
45% reduction. Will the additional exceptions of Italy and the Nether-
lands, all other countries costs have costs (far) below the EC ave-
rage. 
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5.3.3. Nitrogen oxides 
Absolute level of costs and investments 
Table 9 summarises the measures, related costs and investments, as well 
as the emission reduction for NOx· 
The final level of NOx control costs (in 1995), as well as the costs 
per ton abated for each country are presented in table 10. The amount 
of emissions to be abated to meet the bubble part of the Directive is 
the main determinant for the level of costs 5 ). There is one exception. 
Germany carries out its own legislation and does far more then meeting 
the Directive. Differences in the costs per ton abated can be explained 
as follows. 
The Directive leads to low costs for Belgium, Ireland the Netherlands 
and Spain since the amount of emissions to be abated is small and the 
necessary reduction can be reached by combustion modification in com-
bination with two stage combustion. In Denmark and the United Kingdom 
costs are still low but more existing plants need retrofitting. Minor 
differences in costs per ton avoided are mainly the result of differen-
ces in emission factors as well as differences in operating hours and 
the share of retrofit versus newfit. 
More striking are the results for Italy, Germany and Portugal. In these 
countries catalytic reduction is inevitable leading to relatively high 
average costs per ton abated. In Italy and Portugal costs per ton are 
below that of Germany. This is due to the relatively large amount of 
emissions abated by cheap techniques such as combustion modification 
whereas in Germany SCR is the main abatement technology. 
5 ) France and Luxembourg will have some, negligible costs for their new 
industrial plants. These have not been included due to insufficient 
data on the size distribution of industrial plants. 
---~------- --- --- -- ---------------- ---------
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Table 9. Measures, investments, costs and emission reduction for NOx 
(figures in million ECU of 1985) 
Country Measure 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Nether-
lands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United 
Kingdom 
FBC 
CM existing 
TSC 
TOTAL 
TSC new 
TSC existing 
CM existing 
TOTAL 
SCR + CM new 
SCR + CM exist. 
CM new + old 
SCR industry 
CM industry 
TOTAL 
TSC 
CM existing 
TOTAL 
TSC existing 
CM new+old 
SCR + CM 
TOTAL 
TSC new + old 
CM new + old 
FBC industry 
CM industry 
CM extra 
TOTAL 
CM new+old 
TSC existing 
SCR new+o1d 
TOTAL 
TSC new 
CM existing 
TOTAL 
TSC new 
CM existing 
TOTAL 
Size Investments 
(MWe) (1985-1995) 
105 
2348 
560 
3045 
1506 
2570 
3280 
7356 
15278 
12955 
23839 
11754 
53826 
1104 
1399 
2503 
2478 
27473 
13820 
43771 
2838 
8362 
615 
11815 
2838 
600 
1800 
4238 
4101 
3550 
7651 
4802 
32570 
23372 
0 
19 
7 
26 
7 
30 
27 
65 
455 
495 
183 
365 
132 
1620 
11 
11 
22 
27 
217 
333 
577 
15 
60 
0 
3 
5 
83 
15 
7 
120 
149 
22 
29 
51 
26 
263 
289 
Annual 
costs 
(1995) 
0.0 
1.9 
0.5 
2.4 
0.8 
2.7 
3.0 
6.5 
186.7 
267.6 
17.6 
177.8 
17.2 
666.6 
1.3 
1.5 
2.8 
2.0 
21.8 
165.0 
188.8 
1.0 
5.3 
0.0 
0.3 
0.4 
7.0 
2.5 
0.7 
25.6 
28.8 
1.5 
2.7 
4.2 
1.9 
25.9 
27.8 
note: measures refer to power plants unless otherwise stated. 
Emission 
reduction 
(Kton) 
1 
15 
5 
21 
22 
38 
17 
78 
230 
221 
13 
112 
54 
727 
10 
10 
20 
36 
130 
294 
460 
22 
23 
1 
2 
4 
52 
27 
10 
26 
63 
64 
37 
95 
56 
283 
339 
43 
Table 10. Investments and costs of reducing NOx emissions (in million 
ECU's in 1985 prices) 
Country Investments Annual Emission Costs per 
costs abated ton abated 
(1985-1995) (1995) (kton) (ECU/ton) 
Belgium 26 2.4 21 114 
Denmark 65 6.5 78 83 
France 0 0 0 0 
FRGermany* 1620 666.6 727 917 
Greece 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 22 2.8 20 140 
Italy 577 188.8 460 410 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 83 7.0 52 135 
Portugal 149 28.8 63 457 
Spain 51 4.2 95 44 
United Kingdom 289 27.8 339 82 
EEC 2882 934.9 1878 498 
* figures are those of the present national policy which is more than 
sufficient to meet the bubble. 
Costs as percentage of the gross domestic product 
Figure 4 depicts the annual costs as percentage of the Gross Domestic 
Product in each country. 
Generally the costs as % of GDP are close to nil, except for Portugal 
and Germany where costs amount to 0.11% and 0.08% respectively of GDP. 
In Portugal the absolute level of costs may not be impressive but the 
1985 GOP was not very large (28 billion ECU) whereas in Germany both 
abatement costs as well as GDP (827 billion ECU) are large. In Italy 
costs/GOP are slightly above EEC average of some 0.03% of GDP. In Ire-
land costs as percentage of GDP are not quite nil since GDP in Ireland 
is, also very low (24 billion ECU). 
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Figure 4. NOx abatement costs in 1995 (in constant prices of 1985) as 
percentaae of the 1985 gross domestic product(GDP). 
5.3.4. Costa of abating S0 2 and ROx emissions 
Altsolate level of coau anc1 iaveat..nts 
T•ble 11 ausaarisea the investments and costs of both S0 2 and NOx 
emissions. In an absolute sense the costs and investments are very 
large in the Federal Republic of Germany due to their stringent natio-
nal policy. The efforts of Italy and the United Kingdom in response to 
the Directive are also reasonably high. This is mainly the result of 
their S01 abata.ent costs and investments being high. 
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Table 11. Investments and costs of reducing S0 1 and NOx emissions (in 
million ECU's in 1985 prices) 
Country EEC target Investments Annual Emission 
reduction costs abated 
(% of 1980) (1985-1995) (1995) (kton) 
so 1 NOx so 2 NOx so 2 NOx S0 2 NOx 
Belgium 45 30 238 . 26 46 2 67 21 
Denmark 45+ 30 436 65 103 7 201 78 
France 45 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FRGermany 45+ 30+ 4769 1620 977 667 1716 727 
Greece 0 0* 31 0 11 0 25 0 
Ireland 0 0 168 22 40 3 64 20 
Italy 45 30 2319 577 439 189 753 460 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 45+ 30 633 83 129 7 256 52 
Portugal 0* 0 0 149 0 29 0 63 
Spain 10 10 500 51 93 4 180 95 
United Kingdom 45 30 3160 289 628 28 1344 339 
EEC 45 30 12253 2882 2455 935 4606 1878 
,'c granted an increase 
+ actual reduction exceeds the required EC target (a minimum reduc-
tion) 
Costs as percentage of the gross domestic product. 
In figure 5 costs as percentage of the 1985 gross domestic product are 
depicted. 
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Figure 5. NOx and S0 2 costs (in constant prices of 1985) as percent-
age of the 1985 gross domestic product(GDP). 
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Average annual abatement costs in the EC are not very high (0.10% of 
GDP in 1985). Costs are relatively high, compared to the EC average, in 
Germany, Denmark and Ireland. In Denmark as well as in Germany this is 
due to their own stringent policy. If measures effected in Germany 
before 1985 are taken into account costs are even higher (0.14% instead 
of 0.12% of GOP). Costs for Ireland are high since their GDP is low and 
502 abatement costs are high with their increase in, coal-related, sul-
phur emissions. Costs in the United Kingdom and Italy are mainly the 
result of the required 45% 50 2 reduction. In Portugal costs are high 
since NOx ab4tement costs are high compared to the gross domestic 
product. 
~ct on electricity prices 
Ganerally the impact on the electricity production costs (figure 6, 
next page) shows a comparable picture to that of the costs as % of GDP. 
Differences are due to differences in electricity intensity (electrici-
ty consumption/GOP) and the share of fossil fuels in electricity pro-
duction. Figure 6 presents the increase in production costs in ECU/100 
Kwh for the total domestic electricity consumption. Only costs for 
electricity generation are included; costs of industrial measures are 
excluded. For 50 2 the EC average is 0.12 ECU/100 Kwh. As a result of 
the Directive the industrial electricity price for large scale use, 
might rise for most countries between 1 and 3.5%. The impact on the 
electricity price for consumers is smaller since the average electrici-
ty price is higher. For several countries their impact is somewhat 
overestimated since costs were based on the assumption that only power 
plants would take abatement measures. These impacts occur only from 
1995 onwards if all abatement measures are taken. 
In Denmark the impacts of abating 50 2 emissions on electricity produc-
tion costs are high due to its nearly fully (95%) coal based electrici-
ty production. In Germany costs are low since 40% of the electricy is 
produced in non-fossil installations although electricity consumption 
per unit of GDP is very low. If 50 2 abatement measures taken in Germany 
before 1985 are included, the impact on electricity price is comparable 
with that of Denmark (0.23 ECU/100 KWh). In Ireland the electricity 
intensity is quite high so the impact on electricity price is less 
striking as the costs as percentage of GDP. Still the impact in Ireland 
is rather high compared to the relatively minor impact in most coun-
tries. 
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Figure 6. Impact of S0 2 and NOx abatement on the average electricity 
production costs. 
In general the impact for NOx abatement does not exceed the level of 
0.02 ECU/Kwh. The average EEC impact (0.04 ECU/lOOKwh) is only one 
third of the impact for S0 2 • The impacts for Portugal and Germany are 
comparable. The lower electricity intensity of the well developed 
German economy raises the costs per Kwh somewhat whereas in Portugal 
the high electriciy intensity decreases the cost per KWh. In both coun-
tries the share of non-fossil fuels (40%) is comparable although the 
composition is somewhat different. In Italy the electricity intensity 
equals that of Germany. The share of non fossil fuels is less prominent 
(20%) forcing costs/Kwh up somewhat. 
The combined impact of both S0 2 and NOx is not very striking either. 
The highest is in Germany (0.3 ECp/100 Kwh) which corresponds with an 
average increase of some 5% in the industrial electricity price. The 
impact in the Netherlands will be an increase of some 3%. The costs of 
S0 2 abatement are major component in the total costs, except for Portu-
gal and Germany. 
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5.4. Discussion on sensitivity 
Main discussion points 
Several factors have a major impact on the results of the analysis on 
costs, investments and emission reduction: 
- the amount of emissions to be abated to meet the bubble 
the assumption that costs are comparable per country for a speci-
fic abatement technique; unless the defined country specific fac-
tors vary. 
- the assumptions made on the abatement strategy for each country 
e.g. the assumption that the abatement of emissions from all large 
plants would take place via abatement measures on new and, if 
necessary, existing power plants 
- the fact that no (firm) estimate was possible of the emissions and 
costs of the emission standards for new industrial plants. 
The amount of emissions to be abated 
The amount of emissions to be abated depends on the contribution of 
large combustion plants to the total emissions. As stated there is un-
certainty on the present amount of fuel burned especially in industrial 
plants above 50 MWth. In addition· it should be noted that there is even 
more uncertainty on the future amount of fuel burned in such combustion 
installations. 
The recent drop in the oil price is not likely to have a major impact 
on the emissions to be abated. For Spain and Portugal IEA figures used 
for fuel use in industry, compared to the "Energy 2000" used for other 
EC countries, show higher growth rates of energy demand. More uncertain 
seems to be the energy use for electricity generation especially in 
Italy. In addition NOx emissions in 1980, as well as future emissions 
are less firm than those for 50 2 • 
lhe costs per ton abated 
Differences in costs accross countries, due to generic factors, tend to 
be minimised due to existence of an international market for abatement 
technologies. National preferences to buy domestic equipment, even if 
this is more expensive, interfere to a certain extent with this prin-
ciple. Practical experience in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands 
suggest that such preferences do exists but did not lead to significant 
differences in costs. This might well be different for other EC-coun-
tries. For these countries however no practical experience exists. 
Moreover one might doubt if surplus costs caused by these national pre-
ferences can be attributed to pollution control or must be seen as sup-
port for the home industry. Still differences might occur be it only 
for differences in costs of production factors as labour. For SO com-
2 ' 
pared to other information on the costs per ton abated (ADL, 1984), 
estimates made here might somewhat underestimate the costs for Ireland, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. A thourough comparison however was impos-
49 
sible due to lack of insight in the underlying assumptions of the ADL 
study. For NOx costs are more uncertain since less experience 
exists. 
Abatement strategies per country 
The costs of abating S0 2 for all countries except Germany, Denmark and 
the Netherlands were primarily based on the application of FGD on new 
and, if needed, existing plants. This leads to an overestimate of the 
costs since the application of cheaper abatement options, such as low 
sulphur coal and dry sorbent injection for existing power plants and 
new industrial plants, is not taken into consideration. 
For the abatement of NOx the potential of applying cheap abatement 
techniques to new industrial installations was not used. This again 
might lead to an overestimate of costs since relatively more expensive 
techniques, such as CM on existing plants and SCR on new plants, could 
have been avoided. 
On the other hand for some countries, e.g. France and Luxembourg, it is 
an underestimate of the costs since for these countries complying with 
the emission standards for all new plants could be more demanding than 
the abatement required under the bubble concept. To explore the order 
of magnitude of the error introduced an estimate was made on the impact 
of the proposed emission standards for S0 2 for new industrial plants as 
a sensitivity analysis. 
Sensitivity for emission standards on new industrial plants 
The exclusion of abatement measures on new industrial combustion 
plants, needed to meet the emission standards, introduces some ques-
tions: 
* Which abatement measures will be taken for new industrial combus-
tion plants to meet the emission standards for S0 2 and NOx in 
the flue gases? 
* What amounts of S0 2 and NOx are abated in new industrial plants if 
these are to meet these emission standards? 
* If these emission reductions are taken into account, to what 
extent will bubble emission levels be met, and what will it mean 
with regards to the retrofitting existing power plants? 
* What are the associated costs? Will total investments and annual 
costs differ significantly if estimates for new industrial plants 
are included? 
An effort has been made to answer these questions, for the abatement of 
S0 2 • In the calculations a number of assumptions had to be made regar-
ding: 
- fuel characteristics 
- size distribution of the new industrial plants (>300, 100-300, 
50-100 and < 50 MWth) 
- operating hours of plants 
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These resulted in data for future fuel combustion in large industrial 
plants by size category. 
The next - plausible - assumption is that for plants with a power > 300 
MWth flue gas desulphurisation is the most appropriate way to meet the 
emission standards, while for plants with capacities between 100 and 
300 MWth, dry sorbent injection is the likely technique because of its 
relatively low costs. In case of oil combustion use of low sulphur fuel 
oil is an abatement option for small plants as well. Finally it was 
assumed that as a result of the abatement measures for new industrial 
plants, the most expensive measures on existing power plants were avoi-
ded1). 
Conclusions from the sensitivity analysis are as follows. 
For Ireland it seems that by the necessary abatement of emissions from 
new industrial plants expensive abatement (retrofit FGD) on power 
plants could be avoided. In Portugal, Spain, France and Greece the 
application of emission standards for new power as well as industrial 
plants demands more efforts than only the emission reduction under the 
bubble concept. Costs are thus underestimated; for the remaining coun-
tries differences are not significant. 
5.5. Conclusions 
With respect to the control of S0 2 emissions the EC as a whole is ex-
pected to invest 12.3 billion ECU up to 1995 ( in constant prices of 
1985) upon application of the draft Directive. Total annual costs are 
2.5 billion ECU in 1995. To control NOx emissions the EC has to in-
vest some 3.3 billion ECU until 1995. Annual costs are 0.9 billion ECU. 
In an absolute sense Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom bear most of 
the costs of controlling S0 2 emissions; in the case of NOx the costs 
are mainly borne by Germany and to a lesser extent Italy. 
Compared to the 1985 gross domestic product the efforts of Genmany (re-
flecting their stringent national policy), Denmark (mainly national S0 2 
policy) and Ireland (due to S0 2 reduction) are relatively high. Bel-
gium, France, Greece, Luxembourg and Spain are below the EEC average 
(0.1% of GOP) especially since the amount of emissions to be abated is 
small. The need to apply selective catalytic reduction to control NOx 
explains the high costs for Germany (own policy), Italy and Portugal. 
Generally costs to control NOx are negligible. 
The overall impact on the electricity production costs, as an EEC ave-
rage, is some 0.16 ECU per 100 Kwh which corresponds to an increase in 
the electricity price for industries of 2.5 to 3.0%. For Italy and the 
Netherlands the impact is more severe due to a relatively high share of 
fossil fuels in electricity generation and the low electricity inten-
sity (Kwh/GOP) of the economy. In Portugal the impact is lowered 
1 ) Details are to be found in technical document I. 
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due to the high electricity intensity, and the large share of non-
fossil fuels in electricity generation. 
The obtained results are probably most sensitive to the amount of emis-
sions to be abated, the costs per ton abated, the assumed strategy of 
abating all large plants emissions via measures on power plants only, 
and the exclusion of explicit abatement measures related to the emis-
sion standards proposed for new industrial plants. A sensitivity analy-
sis for S0 2 shows that if an estimate for the compliance with emission 
standards for new industrial plants is included costs, investments and 
emission reduction do not change very much. France, Greece, Protugal 
and Spain are exceptions - costs are probably higher - and also Ireland 
- costs lower. 
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&. RESULTS WITH IHTBRLIHK 
6.1. Introduction 
The macroeconomic impact of the Directive on large combustion plants, 
as s~mulated with the adapted OECD INTERLINK model, is the $Ubject of 
this chapter. Attention is focused on second and higher orde~ effects 
on key indicators of national economic activity of pollution control 
investments and costs. This macroeconomic analysis deals with aggregate 
indicators which express broad totals and averages for the whole econo-
my, such as: gross domestic product, employment, consumer prices, cur-
rent balance, private consumption, business investments and government 
financial balances. 
In this contribution only the most important variables, as c~lc~lated 
with INTERLINK, are presented: 
- gross domestic product which represents the value of the total 
production, or output of goods and services, within a country. The 
indicator is important since it chiefly determines the real 
national income and, on the short term, influences employment; 
- business fixed investment: the investments of the busines.s sectors 
in capital goods such as (pollution control) equipment and machin-
ery; 
- employment; 
- private consumption; 
- current balance, or the balance of payments on the current 
account, includes all payments made because of current purchases 
of goods and services. The main item is the trade balance, the 
difference between the dollar value of exports and imports. The 
current balance indicates to what extent policy makers have free-
dom to pursue national economic targets; 
government financial balance is viewed as the difference between 
the revenues and expenditures of the government; 
- consumer prices. Prevention of inflation is one of the targets of 
economic policy because a high price level may have a negative 
effect on the competitive position and production capacity of a 
country. 
To simulate the macroeconomic impacts with INTERLINK it has been 
assumed that the investments in pollution control equipment, in order 
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to meet the Directive, take place in the period 1988 - 1993. The macro-
economic impact however was also simulated for the period 1994- 1997, 
a period in which no such investments take place. This was deemed 
necessary since the influence of pollution control costs is fully re-
flected in the economy only in the longer term. 
To simulate the impacts first a reference or baseline projection is 
made of the economic development without the pollution control pro-
gramme. Next a projection is made which includes the pollution control 
measures. Differences in the resulting economic indicators (e.g. em-
ployment) between projections can be ascribed to the pollution control 
meausures. These differences are discussed in this section. They are 
generally presented as average annual percentage differences over the 
baseline projection for the specific period: 1988 - 1993 and 1994 -
1997. Only the influence on the current account is expressed as an an-
nual difference in billion dollars. 
The assumptions made for these calculations are described in section 
6.2.(Input and assumptions). The results for the control of sulphur 
dioxide emissions are presented and explained in section 6.3. (Results 
for S0 2 ). Results for NOx are the subject of section 6.4 .• Section 
6.5. shows the combined impact ~f reducing S0 2 and NOx emissions. 
Section 6.6. compares the size of the impacts with past changes in eco-
nomic indicators. Elements of uncertainty in the results are discussed 
in section 6.7. Finally the main conclusions of the analysis are 
displayed (section 6.8.). 
6.2. Input and assumptions 
As explained in Chapter 2 a number of key factors will influence the 
macroeconomic impact in each country: 
* the absolute and relative size of the pollution control invest-
ments and costs; 
* the capital and labour intensity, as well as the import co-
efficient of the pollution control measures; 
* the mode of financing the investments (capital market, government 
subsidies, internal business financing); 
* the monetary, exchange rate and budgetary (fiscal) policy of the 
country; 
* the prevailing economic circumstances (e.g. unemployment, overca-
pacity; 
* the transmission of: 
pollution control costs into prices of final demand categories 
(e.g. consumer prices); 
prices in wage changes (wage price indexation); 
* dependence on international trade especially with other EC coun-
tries (the extent of intra-EC trade and its geographical source 
and destination). 
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The absolute and relative size of the costs and investments were dealt 
with in the preceding chapter. Furthermore it is assumed that the pol-
lution control investments take place in the period 1988-1993. 
With respect to the remaining key factors the following should be 
noted. The direct import coefficieny of the pollution control invest-
ments corresponds with that for total investments. This assumption is 
made since no data were available on the import coefficient for air 
pollution control equipment despite documentation on the environmental 
industry (Metra/CITEPA, 1984). 
Pollution control investments are financed as traditional business 
fixed investments. Available data (ERL, 1984) on pollution control sub-
sidies for industry did not allow a comprehensive and uniform inclusion 
of special subsidies for environmental investments for all EC coun-
tries. 
No direct crowding-out (offsetting reduction) of traditional business 
fixed investments is expected to take place since the electricity gene-
ration sector takes the majority of the investments. Such a crowding-
out might otherwise result from limited financial means for investment. 
The electricity generation sector usually is a publicly owned sector 
and postponement of investments in electricity generation due to finan-
cial constraints is not very likely. However, a more indirect negative 
impact on investments is included in the analysis: pollution control 
costs, via a decline in business profits, exert a negative influence on 
business investments. 
As a technical assumption nominal interest rates are kept constant. In 
practice this assumption could hold, if monetary policies are fully 
accomodating. In such a case a possible upward pressure on the interest 
rate is compensated by a balancing change in money supply in such a way 
that nominal interest rates remain constant 1 ). This assumption corres-
ponds with a continuation of past policies (OECD, 1987). 
In addition the volumes of government consumption and investments are 
constant in real terms; a change in the government financial balance 
will not affect the level of government consumption and investment. In 
the absence of information on the budgetary policy this seems plau-
sible. 
Furthermore, nominal exchange rates are fixed; the nominal exchange 
rates remain unchanged from a period shortly before the projection was 
made. This is a customary technical assumption made by the OECD (OECD, 
1987). 
In section 6.7 (Elements of uncertainty) the possible impact on the 
macroeconomic results of changes in these assumptions is investigated. 
1 ) A sensitivity analysis was carried out assuming non-accomodating 
monetary policy. In that case the additional demand for money to 
finance the environmental investments is reflected in a rising nomi-
nal interest rate (see section 6.7). 
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The extent of 'openness' of a country as well as the import share, pre-
vailing economic conditions and the transmission of environmental costs 
into prices and into wages are discussed in the following sections. 
6.3. Results for S0 2 
6.3.1. Introduction 
Although the macroeconomic impacts differ across countries, the results 
display the same basic pattern (see table 12). During the period in 
which the investments take place (1988-1993) indicators of real activi-
ty, such as gross domestic product, are positively influenced. After 
the investment period (1994-1997) however, the environmental costs in-
duce a fall back. First this basic pattern is explained. Subsequently 
the differences in country results are adstructed. 
6.3.2. Basic pattern 
Investment period (1988-1993) 
During the investment period the basic pattern for the main indicators 
can be explained as follows. 
Gross domestic product is stimulated. Firstly since business fixed in-
vestment is influenced positively by the pollution control investments. 
To the extent that the environmental equipment is produced domestical-
ly, domestic demand for capital goods is raised and consequently output 
increases and income is generated. Imports of the investments, and of 
the materials and energy to exploit them, have a positive influence on 
the gross domestic product of other countries since their exports are 
raised. Due to the coordinated EC action the latter impact is impor-
tant. 
Business fixed investment levels are not only higher through environ-
mental investments, but also due to the positive impact of the rise in 
gross domestic product (accelerator). During this period the positive 
impacts on business fixed investments are more important than the nega-
tive influence resulting from pollution control costs. 
The increase in employment during the investment period is mainly caus-
ed by the increase in the general level of activity (as measured in the 
gross domestic product). Exploitation of the pollution control equip-
ment generates little direct permanent employment. 
Private consumption is only slightly positively or negatively influ~n­
ced. This is the consequence of two opposing forces. On the one hand 
national income increases because of the higher level of final demand. 
On the other hand real consumer income is reduced since pollution con-
trol costs are raised. The changes in real income and real consumption 
are the result of changes in nominal income, current prices and wages; 
against a positive impact on the size in nominal income stands an in-
crease in consumer prices. As a result real household disposable income 
as well as consumption is hardly affected. 
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Consumer prices are higher due to the pollution control costs which are 
passed on to consumers, partly directly and partly via price changes. 
In addition wage indexation and import of price increases, resulting 
from pollution control costs in foreign countries, influence prices as 
well. 
In general the current balance deteriorates in the investment period. 
This is mainly the consequence of the additional direct and indirect 
import connected with the environmental investments and more generally 
with the higher level of gross domestic product. This additional import 
is only partly counterbalanced by an increase in the volume of exports 
which results from an increase in market growth. World trade volume 
rises as a result of the coordinated EC action. Export as well as im-
port prices are both higher due to the environmental costs. 
Government financial balances, the difference between revenues and ex-
penditures, are positively influenced. The increase in national income 
leads to an increase in government tax revenues. In addition the social 
security payments are lower because employment is raised. These posi-
tive influences balance the negative impact of additional investment 
subsidies. 
After the investment period (1994-1997) 
In this period the indicators of real activity show an opposite move-
ment in comparison to the first period in most countries. Price levels 
however generally remain on a structurally higher level. Gross domestic 
product and business fixed investment fall below reference levels. 
One explanation is the fact that there are no pollution control invest-
ments taken in this period (neither in the home country nor abroad). 
Once gross domestic product falls the accelerator effect will add to 
the decrease in investments. Moreover business fixed investment levels 
are negatively influenced due to the erosion of business profits resul-
ting from pollution control costs and wage claims. This impact is also 
of importance in the first period but floats to the surface after the 
investment period. Furthermore the increase in price levels result in 
a deterioration of the competitive position of the EC member states 
over non EC countries. As a consequence export volumes will reduce. 
Employment levels are negatively influenced in this period although 
employment in some countries remains positive. The negative impact is 
mainly due to the drop in total expenditures: exports, consumption, as 
well as investments. A positive impact results from a relative improve-
ment in competiveness in certain countries. 
The current balance improves in this period with few exceptions. Import 
volumes are lower since the aggregate levels of expenditures are lower. 
Furthermore export volumes are negatively influenced due to the fall in 
world trade volume and the increase in relative export prices. 
Consumption levels are below baseline levels and consumer prices are 
still higher in this period; consumers are confronted with the structu-
ral higher level of pollution control costs and the gross domestic pro-
TABLE 12 Macroeconomic impacts of reducing so 2 emissions 
BLX DEN FR GER GRE IRE ITA NET POR SPA UKM 
Gross domestic product 
1988 - 1993 0.12 0.17 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.06 
1994 - 1997 -0.03 +0.00 0.03 -0.06 0.05 -0.21 0.03 -0.08 0.03 0.03 -0.05 
Business fixed investmentl 
1988 - 1993 0.60 1.30 . . 1.11 0.16 1.15 1.12 0.79 .. 0.38 1.09 
1994 - 1997 -0.16 -0.20 . . -0.23 0.04 -0.62 0.16 -0.21 .. -0.02 -0.02 
Private consumption 
1988 - 1993 0.02 0.01 .. -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 . . 0.03 -0.03 
1994 - 1997 -0.08 -0.15 . . -0.06 +0.00 -0.29 -0.02 -0.03 .. -0.02 -0.11 
Current balance 2 
1988 - 1993 0.02 -0.06 0.10 -0.21 0.00 -0.05 -0.18 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.22 
1994 - 1997 0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 -0.13 
Employment 
1988 - 1993 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.03 
1994 - 1997 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.11 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.05 
Consumer prices 
1988 - 1993 0.15 0.20 . . 0.34 0.07 0.45 0. 34 0.21 .. 0.14 0.43 
1994 - 1997 0.33 0.36 .. 0.24 0.13 0.56 0.10 0.48 . . 0.19 0.20 
Government financial Bal. 3 
1988 - 1993 0.06 0.10 .. 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.09 . . 0.03 0.08 
1994 - 1997 0.04 0.06 . . 0.06 0.00 -0.16 0.12 0.01 .. 0.01 0.10 
All changes expressed as average annual percentage changes from baseline levels 
1) inclusive of pollution control investments 
2 ) billion $ 
3) % of baseline gross domestic product 
.. not available 
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duct in this period decreases. The costs of emission abatement are re-
flected in higher prices. A second factor causing a rise in domestic 
prices, such as the one for private consumption, is the increase in 
prices of imports from other EC countries. Moreover, wage indexation 
may enforce these prices increases. Eventually prices will increase 
more than the money wage. This causes a decline in real household dis-
posable income to the detriment of real consumption. 
Government financial balances, as percentage of baseline gross domestic 
product are less positively influenced than in the first peribd. Tax 
revenues decline compared to the first period since national income is 
on a lower level. On the other hand investments subsidies decline as 
well. 
6.3.3. Country results for S0 2 
Despite the observed similarities in results there are also differences 
between countries. Differences which can be explained by differences in 
the size of the pollution control programme, the multiplier values and 
the direct import coefficient of investment goods, the extent of wage 
indexation and the dependence on intra EC trade. Although there are 
differences, (see figure 7 and table 12) results for several countries 
are more or less comparable: 
- France and Portugal, 
- Greece and Spain, 
- Ireland, 
- The Netherlands, Belgium and· Denmark, 
- Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. 
France and Portugal 
The macroeconomic impacts for France and Portugal are included in table 
12 for only a few indicators since these countries have no abatement 
investments and costs. Table 12 shows that both countries benefit from 
the improvement in competitive position. In both countries gross domes-
tic product is raised due to the increase in exports and consequently 
employment increases too. 
Greece and Spain 
Fot Greece and Spain the control of S0 2 emissions has a more favourable 
impact than for other countries, with the exception of France and Por-
tugal. Although the impact on gross domestic product is not that high 
it remains positive during both periods: the investment period and the 
second period (1994-1997). Consequently in the second period business 
fixed investment as well as employment remain positive or become only 
very slightly negative. The current balance as well as private consump-
tion and the government financial balance are hardly influenced. Consu-
mer prices are increasing but only very modestly. The reiatively low 
level of pollution control investments and costs is the main explana-
tion for the small extent of the impact. The rise in prices is rela-
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tively modest since the pollution control costs are low. Consequently 
the relative export price of both countries falls. As a result exports 
from Greece and Spain increase. This export impulse accounts for the 
increase in gross domestic product and employment during the full 
period 1988-1997. Since pollution control costs are low the increase in 
consumer prices is initially very low but the rise of import prices 
greatly reinforces the rise in consumer prices. 
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Figure 7. Impact of controlling S0 2 emissions on the gross domestic 
product 
Ireland 
The macroeconomic impact for Ireland is more negative than the basic 
pattern. Gross domestic product , business fixed investment and employ-
ment are still positive in the first period but rapidly become negative 
in the second period. Private consumption from 1994-1997 is declining 
more pronouncedly than in other EC-countries. The current balance and 
even the government financial balance, which is exceptional, deterio-
rate in the second period. 
The relatively high level of pollution control costs is the main cause 
of this negative outcome. These costs cause a rise in prices, including 
export prices, and consequently exports decrease. This decrease in ex-
ports is the main cause of the relatively large dump in gross domestic 
product during the period 1993-1997; the domestic pollution control 
investments having raised gross domestic product during the period 
1988-1993. These negative impacts are reinforced by the relatively 
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strong dependence of the Irish economy on imports from the EC. Rising 
prices in other EC countries, especially the United Kingdom, have a 
considerable impact on the price level in Ireland. This is due to the 
large propensity to import and the fact that imports, originate from 
those EC countries, e.g. the United Kingdom, that have large domestic 
increases in price levels 2 ). In addition the price rise is reinforced 
since money wages, raised in response to the increase in consumer pri-
ces, add to the initial increase in production costs. The fall in gross 
domestic product and the rise in prices account for the decline of con-
sumption and employment in the period 1994-1997. The rise in prices 
however is a temporary phenomenon in Ireland and gradually becomes 
weaker at the end of the second p~riod (1993-1997). 
lbe Nether lands and Belgium 
For the Netherlands and Belgium results are more or less comparable: 
impacts closely resemble the basic pattern although the overall econo-
mic impact on the Belgian economy is slightly better, Both countries 
are relatively open economies: export and import values amount to near-
ly 50% (Netherlands), and 70% (Belgium) of gross domestic product. 
Gross domestic product, business investments as well as employment and 
government financial balances are positively affected in the first 
period and fall slightly back in the second period. As consumer prices 
keep rising in the second period consumption becomes negative. The cur-
rent balance reveals a difference: the Dutch balance is already nega-
tive in the first period and deteriorates further in the second period 
whereas the Belgian balance improves in both periods. 
In both countries the import leakage is quite high, and dependency on 
EC trade is large. Consequently both countries are affected by the in-
ternational character of the proposed EC air pollution control policy. 
The level of costs and investments however is twice as high in the 
Netherlands as in Belgium, which accounts for a large part of the dif-
ferences. 
Export prices rise more in the Netherlands than in Belgium due to the 
higher pollution control costs. Consequently exports are lower and 
gross domestic product and employment are more negatively influenced in 
the Netherlands than in Belgium. Consumption declines less in the 
Netherlands than in Belgium: this can be explained by the fact that in 
the Netherlands money wages are less negatively influenced by price 
increases than in Belgium. As a result the current balance and connec-
ted employment are still positive in Belgium from 1994-1997 whereas 
employment and current balance in the Netherlands become negative. 
2 The propensity to import is the increase in imports which results 
from an increase in the national income or the gross domestic pro-
duct. 
• 
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Denmark 
The picture for Denmark differs somewhat from Belgium and the Nether-
lands. Gross domestic product and business fixed investment initially 
rise more sharply since the environmental investments are higher. For 
the same reason the current balance is negatively influenced in the 
first period. The other indicators show the more general picture: a mo-
dest increase in employment, consumption, consumer prices and govern-
ment finan~ial balance. In the second period the divergence from the 
developments in Belgium and the N~therlands is remarkable. Gross domes-
tic product and employment are more positive whereas consumption is 
more negative compared to Belgium or the Netherlands. 
A major factor which accounts for these differences is the lower res-
ponse of money wages, via price-wage indexation, to price changes in 
Denmark compared with Belgium and the Netherlands. The decline in pri-
vate consumption is relatively large due to the shrinkage in real 
wages. Thus rising wages do not add very much to the initial price in-
creases caused by the pollution control costs. In addition the import 
coefficient for Denmark is smaller than those for Belgium and the 
Netherlands, and Danish imports are less originating from EC countries. 
As a result rising import prices affect the price level of consumption 
to a lesser degree and the increase in export prices is relatively more 
modest. In spite of the fact that S0 2 abatement costs in Denmark are 
twice as high than in the Netherlands the impact on gross domestic pro-
duct, employment, and current balance is more positive in Denmark than 
in their Dutch counterparts. It is the better export performance in 
Denmark that explains differences between both countries in the second 
period. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
The impacts for Germany do not differ very much from the basic pattern: 
a positive impact during the investment period due to pollution control 
expenditures, and a later negative impact due to the pollution control 
costs. 
The pollution control costs and investments are relatively high which 
rxplains the relatively strong impact. The rise in consumer prices, as 
well as other prices is modest in relation to the pollution control 
costs. The major reason for this is that the impact of imported prices 
increases is less important in Germany in comparison to other large 
countries such as the United Kingdom and Italy. This is due to the 
relatively smaller import coefficient of Germany. As a result the com-
petitive position in Germany, in spite of the higher abatement costs, 
deteriorates less. Over both periods the picture remains satisfactory 
although consumption is negatively affected by the costs of pollution 
control. 
Italy 
Results for Italy are more positive than for Germany. Although the re-
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suits display the same basic pattern, there are some differences. Em-
ployment, though hardly affected, remains positive whereas consumer 
prices,. especially in the second period, increase mere slowly in Ita-
ly. 
The size of the abatement programme in Italy is about two-thirds of 
that of the German effort, so the initial impact is proportionally lo-
wer. In Italy however the competitive position deteriorates less than 
in Germany and, more significantly, improves in the second period. Next 
to the lower level of abatement costs this can be explained by the com-
position of the Italian exports; a relative large share of the Italian 
exports is geared towards countries with higher price increases, nota-
bly Germany, but also the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
As a result relative export prices even improve. Consequently Italian 
exports perform somewhat better than in Germany. Consumption expendi-
ture declines only slightly in the second period since pollution con-
trol costs are relatively low compared to Germany. The decrease in 
gross domestic product in the period 1994-1997 is only small since ex-
ports and consumption decrease only slightly. Business financial balan-
ces, business investments and employment still remain positive, al-
though only slightly. 
United Kingdom 
The impact of abating S0 2 emissions in the United Kingdom is somewhat 
more negative than in Germany, especially in the first period (1988-
1993). The increase in gross domestic product in the first period is 
smaller, private consumption declines more and the current balance is 
more negatively affected. 
This is so despite the fact that the pollution control investments and 
costs, in comparison to the gross domestic product, are (only slightly) 
smaller in the United Kingdom. One possible cause of this more unfa-
vourable impact is the higher import coefficient in the United Kingdom. 
As a consequence the initial impact on the gross domestic product is 
smaller and imports increase relatively faster. In addition pollution 
control costs seem te be more fully reflected in rising prices, i.e. 
export prices. Probably money wages respond quicker and to a larger 
extent to price changes. This add~ to the increase in the domestic 
price level caused by the increase in pollution control costs. As a 
result prices, including export prices, increase more in the United 
Kingdom. Consequently the relative competitive position is more nega-
tively affected in the United Kingdom and exports thus decrease more 
than in Germany. This decrease in exports accounts for the less favour-
able impact on gross domestic product, employment and current balance 
in the period 1994-1997. In this period the impact on employment is 
more negative in Germany than in the United Kingdom whereas in the 
United Kingdom the level of consumption decreases more. Towards the end 
of this period the differences between both countries appear to be less 
pronounced than in the first periodl). 
• 
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6.4. Results for HOx 
6.4.1. Introduction 
This section briefly presents and explains the macroeconomic impacts of 
reducing NOx emissions. The main results are summarised in table 13. 
6.4.2. Basic pattern 
The basic pattern for S0 2 has been explained in detail in the previous 
section. For NOx therefore only the most salient differences are dis-
cussed. Taking a look at the figures in table 13 (next page) it is pos-
sible to recognise the same basic pattern. In the first period (1988-
1993) the results are positive for all countries; gross domestic pro-
duct, business investments as well as employment rise due to the addi-
tional expenditures on environmental investments. These investments 
induce an increase in other expenditures and cause imports to rise so 
current balances are affected negatively. Consumer prices rise slight-
ly, consumption stabilises and government financial balances improve. 
In the second period the trend corresponds with that of S0 2 • Gross do-
mestic product, investments and employment as well as consumption fall 
down. Consumer prices remain on a higher level whereas the current 
balance generally improves. 
The most important difference between S0 2 and NOx is the size of the 
investment program. In the case of NOx the environmental costs and 
investments for most countries are far below the costs and investments 
of S0 2 control, explaining the smaller macroeconomic impact for most 
countries. 
6.4.3. Country results for HOx 
There are only a few exceptions to the conclusion that the impact of 
controlling NOx emissions is small namely: the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Portugal and to a lesser extent Italy. For remaining countries 
impacts are marginal (see figure 8 and table 13). 
France and Greece 
France and Greece have no pollution control costs at all and benefit 
from pollution control investments elsewhere in the EC. 
Gross domestic product and employment rise. The impact is due to the 
increase in world trade volume and the relative improvement in compe-
tiveness in both countries. 
Germany and Portugal 
For Germany and Portugal the impact is greater than for the other coun-
tries. Gross domestic product, business investments and employment are 
3 ) This is probably due to the fact that money wages respond quite 
strongly to short term changes. So price increases are quite rapidly 
passed on in wage changes but are also even rapidly fading out. 
TABLE 13 Macroeconomic impacts of controlling NOx emissions 
BLX DEN FR GER GR IRE ITA NET POR SPA UKM 
Gross domestic product 
1988 - 1993 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.01 
1994 - 1997 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 
Business fixed investmentl 
1988 - 1993 0.10 0.18 . . 0.43 .. 0.15 0.30 0.12 0.49 0.05 0.10 
1994 - 1997 -0.02 -0.05 .. -0.05 . . -0.09 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
Private consumption 
1988 - 1993 0.00 0.00 . . 0.00 .. 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 
1994 - 1997 -0.02 -0.03 . . -0.02 .. -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 
Current balance2 
1988 - 1993 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.15 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
1994 - 1997 0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.21 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.02 
Employment 
1988 - 1993 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
1994 - 1997 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Consumer prices 
1988 - 1993 0.03 0.03 .. 0.15 . . 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.06 
1994 - 1997 0.08 0.06 . . 0.12 .. 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.06 
Government financial Bal. 3 
1988 - 1993 0.01 0.01 . . 0.06 .. 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 
1994 - 1997 0.01 0.00 .. 0.04 . . -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Figures expressed as annual average percentage changes over the baseline levels 
l) inclusive of environmental investment 
2) billion $ 
3 ) % of baseline gross domestic product 
.. not available 
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more positively affected in the first period. Consumer prices increase 
in the first (1988-1993) as well as in the second period (1994-1997). 
The main explanation is the higher level of environmental investments 
and costs in both countries. The higher domestic environmental invest-
ments strongly influence the impact on gross domestic product and busi-
ness fixed investments; the higher level of abatement costs strongly 
influence consumer prices, current balance and consumption level. 
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Figure 8. Impact of controlling NOx emissions on the gross domestic 
product. 
There are also differences between Portugal and Germany; gross domestic 
product as well as employment are negatively influenced in Germany in 
the second period. In Portugal however both indicators remain positive 
but decline. The German economy is less sensitive to coordinated action 
due to its relatively large size. In addition Germany takes the majo-
rity (60%) of the investments in NOx control while the Portuguese 
contribution in an absolute sense is very small (less than 10%). Conse-
quently the potential market growth is very high for Portugal and small 
for Germany. 
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In both countries competitiveness deteriorates but less so for Portu-
gal. This is due to the fact that' Portugal is able to improve its rela-
tive export price over Germany. As a result, and especially during the 
investment period (1988-1993), German exports decline whereas the vol-
ume of the Portuguese exports increases. In Portugal however import 
prices increase more. On balance the impact on the current balance in 
the first period, in relation to the size of the initial pollution con-
trol investments, is more or less comparable for both countries, al-
though different in billion dollars. Due to the fact that the initial 
impulse in Portugal is greater, in relation to the size of its economy, 
it exerts a more positive, but shrinking impact in the longer term. 
Italy 
The overall impact is quite positive for Italy. Gross domestic product, 
business investments and employment remain positive in the second pe-
riod. Although the current balance is negatively influenced in the sec-
ond period (1994-1997) it deteriorates less than in Germany. 
The impact is not as large as in Portugal or Germany due to the smaller 
size of the environmental investments and costs. In the first period 
Italy derives some benefits since its export markets, especially in 
Germany, increase. Moreover competitiveness deteriorates less. As a 
result the volume of export grows in the first period. In the second 
period Italy improves its relative competitiveness over Germany: the 
relative export price for manufacturers even improves. As a result ex-
ports fall less and investments, gross domestic product and employment 
remain positive. 
BelgiUDI. Denmark. Ireland. the Hetherlands. Spain and the United 
Kingdom 
For Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom the proposed NOx control programme has only a small impact; 
however, the eventual impact is somewhat more positive for Spain and 
Belgium and somewhat more negative for Ireland. In all these countries 
the pollution control costs and investments are very small compared to 
the size of the economy, and this explains the small impact. 
Spain and Belgium benefit more from coordinated action since their 
abatement costs are very low and ~hey are able to improve their compet-
itive position. In addition the volume of exports from Belgium in-
creases more since the relevant export markets, especially in Germany, 
grow more. 
Ireland however, is hardly able to benefit from the coordinated im-
pulse. Firstly the environmental costs are somewhat higher than in Bel-
gium and Spain and, due to Ireland's bigger import leakage and import 
of price increases, the competitive position deteriorates more. The 
export volumes increase in the first period because the international 
market grows. The volume of imports however also rises and, as a re-
sult, the current balance deteriorates. The final impact remains very 
small. 
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In Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom pollution control 
costs are small. As a result the relative export prices of manufactures 
are hardly affected over both periods. There are only marginal dif-
ferences between these countries which are related to the geographical 
distribution of exports and the origin of the imports. The Netherlands 
is influenced somewhat more due to the more open character of its eco-
nomy. During the investment period the expenditures are increased some-
what. On the other hand in the second period the rise of import prices 
is of importance and the competitive position is slightly deterio-
rating. 
6.5. Results for the sum of S0 2 and HOx 
6.5.1. Introduction 
Table 14 (next page) contains the results of the combined·impact of 
controlling S0 2 and NOx emissions. Effects are only briefly discussed 
and reference is made to the preceding sections on S0 2 and NOx for 
details. First the basic pattern is summarised and subsequently the 
main differences between countries are discussed. 
6.5.2. Basic pattern for S0 2 plus HOx 
During the period in which the environmental investments take place 
(1988-1993) gross domestic product, business investments, employment as 
well as government financial balances are influenced positively and the 
current balance negatively. Despite the increase in nominal income con-
sumption is hardly affected since consumer prices also rise. In the 
second period (1994-1997) gross domestic product, investments and em-
ployment fall, the current balance becomes less negative and the gov-
ernment financial balance is less positive. The consumer prices in-
crease to a larger extent than nominal income, which results in lower 
levels of consumption. Summarised over both periods the impact is posi-
tive for indicators of macroeconomic activity: gross domestic product, 
employment and business fixed investment. Only consumption is at a low-
er level. Consumer prices are also at a higher level and the current 
balance is negatively affected. 
6.5.3. Differences between countries 
Results for S0 2 and NOx combined are quite similar to those for S0 2 
alone, except for countries where investments in NOx control are 
high: Germany, Portugal and to a lesser extent Italy. Table 14 shows 
that combined control of S0 2 and NOx has a net negative impact for 
Ireland and a very positive impact for Spain, Portugal, Greece and, in 
a sense also for Italy. The impact on the remaining countries is gene-
rally positive; this impact is somewhat less for Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands and somewhat more for Belgium and Denmark. 
The impacts for France, which has no abatement costs, are positive as 
well. 
TABLE 14 The macroeconomic impacts of controlling so2 and NOx emissions 
BLX DEN FR GER GRE IRE ITA NET POR SPA UKM 
Gross domestic product 
1988 - 1993 0.15 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.07 
1994 - 1997 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.07 -0.24 0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.04 -0.06 
Business fixed investmentl) 4) 5) 
1988 - 1993 0.69 1.48 .. 1.54 0.16 1.30 1.44 0.90 0.49 0.43 1.19 
1994 - 1997 -0.19 -0.25 .. -0.28 0.04 -0.41 0.21 -0.25 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Private consumption 4) 5) 
1988 - 1993 0.02 0.00 .. -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.03 
1994 - 1997 -0.09 -0.18 .. -0.07 0.00 -0.33 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.14 
Current balance2) 
1988 - 1993 0.02 -0.07 0.12 -0.36 0.00 -0.06 -0.22 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.22 
1994 - 1997 0.05 -0.03 -0.15 -0.27 0.00 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.04 0.04 -0.11 
Employment 
1988 - 1993 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.04 
1994 - 1997 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.14 0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.07 
Consumer prices ') 
1988 - 1993 0.18 0.23 0.08 0.49 0.09 0.51 0.42 0.24 0.18 0.17 0.48 
1994 - 1997 0.40 0.42 0.27 0.36 0.16 0.66 0.14 0.58 0.31 0.24 0.27 
Government financial Bal. 3 ) 4) 5) 
1988 - 1993 0.08 0.12 .. 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.09 
1994 - 1997 0.05 0.07 .. 0.09 0.00 -0.18 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.10 
Figures expressed as average annual percentage changes from baseline levels 
1) inclusive of environmental investment 4) impact of abatement NOx emissions not available 
2) billion $ 5) impact of abatement so2 emissions not available 
3) % of baseline gross domestic product 1 ) deflator for GDP 
.. not available 
69 
Ireland 
In Ireland results are more negative due to the relatively high pollu-
tion control costs, especially for S0 2 which leads to a deterioration 
of its international competitiveness. Moreover the import coefficient 
is high. This raises import prices and adds to the deterioration in 
competiveness. As a result gross domestic product, consumption current 
balance as well as government financial balance over both periods 
(1988-1997) are negatively influenced, although employment is hardly 
affected. The rise in consumer prices is considerable but one should 
note that towards the end of the second period the price increases be-
come less prominent. In comparison to other countries the price rises 
are a more temporary phenomenon in Ireland. 
Spain. Portugal. Greece and Italy 
The impact on Spain, Greece and, to a lesser extent, on Portugal and 
Italy is clearly positive. Gross domestic product, employment and gov-
ernment financial balance are affected positively during both periods. 
Consumption and current balance are hardly affected. 
For Spain and Greece this is due to their relatively low level of pol-
lution control costs which leads to an improvement in their competi-
tiveness. The increase in prices of imports from EC countries with high 
pollution control costs counterbalances the strengthening of the com-
petitive position. This rise in import prices adds to price increases 
caused by domestic pollution control. 
In.Italy pollution control costs are higher than in Spain or Greece. 
Although relative export prices go up in Italy the country is still 
able to increase the export volume in the first period due to the 
growth in relevant export markets. In the second period Italy improves 
competitiveness; its main competitors (e.g. Germany, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands) are confronted with higher increases in export prices 
during the period 1988-1993. 
In Portugal environmental investments and costs are twice as high as in 
Spain and Greece. Despite this high level of pollution control costs 
the competitive position of Portugal does not deteriorate substantial-
ly, and exports and current balance are not affected too adversely. 
However, results are less positive than for Spain or Greece, especially 
for the current balance. Due to the large size of the impulse gross 
domestic product and employment remain positive in Portugal, although 
declining, during the full period 1988-1997. 
Germany and the United Kingdom 
Macroeconomic results for Germany and the United Kingdom more or less 
resemble the basic pattern. However, the eventual impact for Germany is 
more prominent since the abatement program is larger. The German re-
sults are more positive during the investment period and more negative 
afterwards. The lower impulse in the United Kingdom compared to Germany 
induces a less prominent impact on gross domestic product, business 
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investments and employment. Compared to Germany the United Kingdom has 
a larger import coefficient and imports originate from countries with a 
high price increase. These factors explain the relatively larger volume 
of imports, larger price increases, deteriorating competitiveness, and 
consequently decreasing exports in the United Kingdom. These have a 
negative influence on the gross domestic product which decreases as 
much as the German gross domestic product in the period 1994-1997. This 
despite the fact that costs to control S0 2 and NOx emissions in the 
United Kingdom are only seven-tenths of those in Germany. 
The Hether lands 
Foreign emission control policies influence the economy of the Nether-
lands more strongly, compared to Germany or the United Kingdom, due to 
the greater dependence on international trade. In the first period the 
Netherlands is able to benefit from the EC abatement policy: the Dutch 
exports increase as a result of the rise in foreign expenditures and 
income in all EC countries. In the second period, however, the rise in 
import prices affects the domestic price level, among them the export 
price, rather strongly. (The importcoefficient of the Netherlands, 
being twice as high as the ones for the United Kingdom, respectively 
Germany). As a result the impact in the second period is somewhat more 
negative. 
Belgium and Denmark 
The impact on the Belgian and the Danish economy is more positive than 
for the Netherlands although for different reasons. In both countries 
employment remains positive after the investment period and gross 
domestic product does not fall substantially in the second period. The 
Belgian current balance even improves in the second period whereas the 
Danish balance deteriorates less than the Dutch current balance. In 
both Belgium and Denmark the rise in consumer prices and the drop in 
consumption is relatively high. 
The positive impact on Denmark corresponds to the large size of the 
pollution control investments. The Belgium pollution control impulse is 
far smaller but Belgium benefits more from the EC-wide rise in expendi-
tures. Belgium is more export-orientated than Denmark; the rise in spe-
cific EC expenditures as described here has a favourable impact on the 
exports. Also exports increase since the competitive position of Bel-
gium improves as a result of the relatively small pollution control 
costs. However, this open character of the Belgium economy also facili-
tates the import of price increases. Moreover, the responsiveness of 
money wages to price increases in Belgium is somewhat higher in Belgium 
than in Denmark. Thus the improvement in the relative export price of 
manufacturers, observed in the first period, is not maintained in the 
second period. The drop in exports is the main cause of the slightly 
negative economic performance in Belgium in the period 1994-1997. 
Denmark improves competitiveness in the first period. The rise in pri-
ces is relatively modest compared with the rather high level of pollut-
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ion control costs. In Denmark the impact of r1s1ng import prices, rela-
tive to Belgium, is smaller; the import coefficient in Denmark is lower 
and imports tend to originate from non-EC countries. Domestic pollution 
control costs however are far higher in Denmark than in Belgium and the 
eventual impact on consumer prices is comparable in both countries. The 
higher pollution control costs in Denmark, in combination with the 
lower responsiveness for money wages for price changes, explain the 
negative impact on consumption. The higher initial investments, and the 
smaller drop in nominal income, result in a more positive impact on 
government financial balance and on employment relative to Belgium. 
6.6. The relative size of the impacts 
A main conclusion of the analysis is that the macroeconomic impacts of 
the proposed Directive on large combustion plants are very small. Table 
15 shows the changes in some of the macroeconomic variables over the 
past seven years to illustrate this. 
Tabel 15. Economic indicators in the recent past 
Indicator Gross Private consumption Total Current 
domestic employ- balance 
product prices level ment in 1985 
Country (%) (%) (%) (%) billion 
Belgium 1.2 6.7 0.6 -0.6 0.7 4 ) 
Denmark 1. 9 8.5 0.9 0.5 -2.7 
France 1.1 9.9 1.8 -0.3 -0.2 
Germany 1.3 4.1 0.7 -0.3 13.2 
Greece 1.1 20.1 1.5 1.3 -3.3 
Ireland 2.0 12.5 -1.1 -1.1 -0.6 
Italy 1.4 15.3 1.6 0.4 -4.2 
Netherlands 0.7 4.4 -0.3 0.9 5.2 
Portugal 1.6 22.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Spain 1. 4 11. 6· 0.4 -1.6 2.7 
United Kingdom 1.2 8.5 1.7 -0.7 3.8 
All percentages are average annual changes for the period 1979-1985. 
Sources: Eurostat (1987), OECD (1987a), OECD (1987b). 
$ 
From a comparison of table 15 with table 14 (the combined impact of 
controlling S0 2 and NOx emissions) it can be seen that the impact of 
the pollution control program on the gross domestic product is general-
ly smaller than 10% (period 1988-1993) to 5% (period 1994-1997) of the 
4 ) For the jointly modelled Belgium-Luxembourg economy. 
5 ) Although the direction of the change might be opposite to past 
changes as the preceding section showed. 
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general changes over the past period 1979-1985. 5 ) Only in Ireland and 
the Netherlands is the impact higher. The impact on consumer prices 
resulting from the pollution programme for most countries (including 
Ireland), is only around 5% of the observed changes in the past (1979-
1985). For Germany and the Netherlands the impact is some one-tenth of 
past changes. 
The impact of the Directive on the level of private consumption, during 
the investment period (1988-1993) is not larger than 5% of the average 
annual change in the past seven years. 
In the second period (1994-1997) the impact of the Directive is more 
prominent: 5 to 25% of past changes. This is especially so in Denmark 
and Ireland. 
With regards to employment the average annual change caused by the pol-
lution control programme would remain below or around one-tenth of his-
torical changes described in table 15. Only in Germany would the impact 
be half of the (minor) annual change in the past. 
Compared to the position of the current balance in 1985 (expressed in 
billion US dollars) one might see that the impact of the Directive is 
only a small percentage of the 1985 balance deficit/surplus. Exceptions 
are France, Ireland and Portugal where the impact is more significant. 
Even taking into account the restricted number of key indicators and 
the limited time period observed, the conclusion is warranted that the 
macroeconomic impacts of the proposed Directive are very small compared 
to past changes in macroeconomic indicators. 
6.7. Elements of uncertainty 
The main factors that influence the results are: 
* the level of abatement investments and costs; 
* the assumed constant nominal interest rate; 
* the fact that exchange rates are fixed; 
* no direct 'crowding out' of traditional investments is taking place; 
* the direct import share of investments in pollution control corres-
ponds with the import share of total fixed investments; 
* the exclusion of reductions in environmental damage. 
Level of abatement costs and investments 
A sensitivity analysis for the abatement of S0 2 emissions (chapter 5) 
revealed that costs and investments do not change substantially if an 
estimate of the impact of emission standards for new industrial plants 
is included; exceptions include France, Greece, Portugal and Spain whe-
re costs would probably be higher. For Ireland however, costs could be 
lower. If countries have a strong preference to buy domestic pollution 
control equipment, even if this is more expensive, costs for the abate-
ment of S0 2 emissions could be higher, especially for Ireland, Spain 
and the United Kingdom. Costs for the abatement of S0 2 as well as NOx 
could be lower if other abatement strategies are included such as ener-
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gy conservation, fuel substitution, use of low sulphur coal and combus-
tion modifications on new industrial plants instead of catalytic reduc-
tion on power plants. 
Generally costs for abating NOx emissions are more uncertain than the 
costs for controlling S0 2 emissions. 
If abatement costs and investments are higher the positive macroecono-
mic impact during the investment period will be reinforced but the ne-
gative impact, observed after the investment period, will also be 
strengthened. The result also depends on the ratio between investments 
and costs; a higher ratio induces a more favourable impact due to the 
increase in (investment) expenditures and the decrease in cost-related 
negative impacts. If countries rely more on home-made pollution control 
equipment, costs could be higher and the negative impact in the second 
period could be more pronounced. Over against that the importcoeffi-
cient would be smaller, investments would be higher, and consequently 
the positive impact during the investment period would be reinforced. 
A flexible interest rate 
In this study the nominal interest rate was kept constant. This assumes 
a continuation of present, accomo~ating monetary policies in the EC 
member states. A sensitivity analysis with INTERLINK revealed that, by 
keeping the money supply constant, the short term interest rate would 
rise by as much as 0.2 to 0.5% in the period 1988-1997 6 ). In the same 
period the long term interest rate would rise by 0.1 to 0.25%. As a 
result the pollution control programmes would have a predominantly ne-
gative impact on employment, the gross domestic product, and the go-
vernment financial balance due to the increased interest rate. The con-
sumer prices would be slightly lower (about 0.1% in the period 1994-
1997) compared to the increase observed with a fixed nominal interest 
rate. 
Flexible exchange rates 
Furthermore a fixed exchange rate was assumed. Most EC countries, ex-
cept Greece, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, take part in the 
EMS (European Monetary System) which explicitly aims at fixed exchange 
rates. In addition the assumption of a fixed rate is commonly used by 
the OECD in its 'Economic outlook'. However, a flexible exchange rate 
exists in relation to important trade partners (e.g. Japan, USA). Al-
though no sensitivity analysis was carried out, the introduction of a 
flexible exchange rate would affect the macroeconomic indicators in a 
positive direction: exports would decrease less, imports would increase 
less, current balance deficits would be smaller or surpluses would en-
large. As a result gross domestic product and employment would perform 
somewhat better but prices would be higher since the prices of 
6 ) The analysis was carried out for the combined impact of controlling 
S0 2 and NOx emissions. Detailed results of this analysis are dis-
played in technical document II: INTERLINK: modifications and de-
tailed results. 
74 
imports from Japan and the USA would increase slightly. In quite the 
same manner the existence of a flexible exchange rate in Greece, Portu-
gal, Spain and the United Kingdom might improve the macroeconomic im-
pacts of these countries relative to other EC countries. 
Direct crowding-out 
It was assumed that investments in pollution control equipment do not 
directly lead to a 'crowding-out', or offsetting reduction, of other 
investments. Since the majority of the pollution control investments 
take place in publicly-owned, power plants this is a plausible assump-
tion: a postponement of investments in electricity generation due to 
financial constraints is not likely. One should remember that the in-
direct decrease in business fixed investment as a result of the in-
creased pollution control costs, and thus decreased profitability, is 
included in the INTERLINK model. If more investments were to be made 
by the industrial sector direct 'crowding-out' would become more rele-
vant and the macroeconomic impact. could be more negative. 
Direct import share of pollution control investments 
The assumption that the direct import share of investments in pollution 
control corresponds with the import share of total fixed investments, 
means that countries with a strong position on the market of investment 
goods also have a strong position in air pollution control equipment. 
Given the fact that Germany is well ahead with the implementation of 
its national pollution control policy, and seems to have established a 
well developed environmental industry, the negative impact for Germany 
could be somewhat overestimated. Conversely the impact for other coun-
tries might be somewhat more negative. 
Impact of damage reduction 
In this study it was impossible to include the macroeconomic impact of 
reductions in damage that result from the proposed Directive. Although 
the extent of the damage reduction resulting from implementation of the 
Directive is uncertain, the positive macroeconomic impact of this 
Directive is probably underestimated since the positive impacts of 
damage reduction, increased productivity and other so called 'utility-
increasing' benefits (see chapter 2, section 2.3 and appendix A) are 
excluded. 
Finally 
One possible misunderstanding should be removed. One might think that 
the above pollution control programme is subject to a higher margin of 
error since the impacts are only marginal. There are no logical argu-
ments however for the viewpoint that the margins of error would increa-
se, and even exceed the initial impacts because the latter impacts are 
smaller. The macroeconomic impacts are small simply because the costs 
and investments of the Directive, related to the size of the national 
15 
economy, are very small. Of course it is so that, due to rounding, dif-
ferences calculated accurately with the model become smaller in the 
final presentation 7 ). 
Next to these uncertainties one should note that, despite the experien-
ce gained with the INTERLINK model, it is still difficult to model rea-
lity. For example the modelling of behavioural relations, such as in-
vestment behaviour, is one of the most difficult and controversial 
tasks in macroeconomic modelling. Results therefore should not be 
looked upon in a deterministic manner. The model should be seen as a 
useful tool to understand possible changes in complex economic reality, 
given various assumptions, of an exogenously determined change, such as 
the Directive on large combustion plants. 
Despite the elements of uncertainty the major conclusion of this study 
would not be affected: the Directive only has a small, positive macro-
economic impact during the investment period and a small, negative im-
pact in the subsequent period. Of course the distribution of positive 
and negative macroeconomic impacts over the various EC countries could 
differ: a definite answer on the changes amongst countries however is 
not possible without a renewed analysis with INTERLINK. 
6.8. Conclusions 
A main conclusion of the analysis is that the macroeconomic impacts of 
the proposed Directive on large combustion plants are very small. Com-
pared to changes in economic indicators, observed in the recent past, 
changes induced by the Directive generally are not greater than 5 to 
10%. The impacts on macroeconomic indicators are very small since the 
size of the costs and investments of controling S0 2 and NOx emis-
sions, compared to the size of the national economy, is very small. The 
macroeconomic impact for the control of NOx emissions is even smaller 
than that for so2. 
For most countries gross domestic product, employment, business fixed 
investments and government financial balances are positively influenced 
during the period in which the investments take place, (1988-1993). 
After the investment period (1994-1997) the pollution control costs 
induce a drop in these indicators. Over both periods consumer prices 
are at a higher level, consumption as well as current balance are nega-
tively affected but the remaining indicators such as employment and 
gross domestic product are positively influenced. 
The control of S0 2 emissions has a rather negative but still small im-
pact for Ireland and a positive impact for France, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain. The control of NOx emissions for most countries has a negli-
gible impact. For the Federal Republic of Germany the impact is more 
7 ) Due to rounding the difference between e.g. 0.01 and 0.00 is only 
marginal. 
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negative; for Italy, Portugal as well as France and Greece the macro-
economic impacts are notably and predominantly positive. 
The combined control of S0 2 and NOx emissions is negative for Ire-
land, extremely positive for France, Greece, Portugal and Spain. The 
eventual impacts for the remaining countries are less prominent but 
positive for Italy, Belgium and Denmark. For Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom the impacts are more or less neutral. 
Assumptions and data on the following factors are believed to have a 
major impact on the results: the pollution control investments and 
costs, the interest rate, the exchange rates, direct 'crowding-out' of 
traditional investments, the import share of investments in pollution 
control and the exclusion of the reduction in environmental damage. 
Changes in underlying assumptions could either have a positive or a 
negative effect on the simulated impacts. Although the distribution of 
(small) positive and negative impacts amongst different countries could 
be affected, changes in the above factors are not believed to alter the 
conclusion that the macroeconomic impacts of the proposed Directive are 
small. 
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7. COKCLUSIONS 
Abatement strategies to meet the Directive 
Regarding the control of S0 2 emissions Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany as well as the Netherlands will carry out their own policy and 
do more then meet the Directive. France, Portugal as well as Luxembourg 
do not take measures. The other countries comply with the emission 
standards for large plants and if necessary apply additional flue gas 
desulphurization on existing plants as well to meet the bubble. 
For the control of NOx emissions the Federal Republic of Germany con-
tinues it's present national policy. The Netherlands does the same but 
has to take additional measures. France, Greece nor Luxembourg take 
abatement measures. Remaining countries apply combustion modification 
to meet the emissions standards for their new plants. If this proves 
insuffient to meet the bubble additional measures are taken in the most 
cost effective manner. 
Costs, investments and the impact on electricity production costs 
Up to 1995 the EC would invest 12.3 billion ECU (constant prices of 
1985) to reduce S0 2 emissions of large combustion plants with some 45% 
over the 1980 level if the EC Directive were to be accepted. Annual 
costs of this policy are 2.5 billion ECU in 1955. In an absolute sense 
Germany, the United Kingdom as well as Italy carry most of these costs 
(more then 80% of the EC total). But compared to the gross domestic 
product costs are relatively high in Ireland, Denmark, Germany and the 
United Kingdom. 
To control NOx emissions of large plants investments would amount up 
to 2.9 billion ECU, annual costs are some 0.9 billion ECU. The eventual 
reduction reached in total EC large plants emissions is 45%. The Fede-
ral Republic of Germany is mainly responsable for these efforts (70% of 
total EC costs) but the contribution of Italy (20%) is worth mentio-
ning. Efforts of other countries are small. Compared to the gross do-
mestic product the costs are high in Portugal and Germany and to a les-
ser extent in Italy. 
The impact of S0 2 abatement on the electricityprice for large scale 
industrial use is an increase which is generally between 1 to 3.5%. The 
impact of NOx abatement is negligible. 
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The macroeconomic impacts 
With respect to the second and higher order macroeconomic impacts the 
following can be concluded. 
A more general conclusion is that the macroeconomic impact is positive 
during the period in which the investments take place (1988-1993) due 
to the expenditure impulse. After this period (1994-1997) there is 
slight deterioration as a result of the increasing pollution control 
costs. 
During the period in which the investments take place in all countries 
indicators of real activity, such as gross domestic product, business 
investments as well as employment rise due to the additional expendi-
tures on environmental investments. The investments cause imports to 
rise so current balances show a deficit. Consumer prices rise slightly, 
consumption stabilises and the government financial balances improve. 
After the investment period however the environmental costs induce a 
fall back. Gross domestic product, investments and employment as well 
as consumption fall down. Consumer prices remain on higher level where-
as the current balance generally improves. 
Over both periods the impacts are generally positive for gross domestic 
product, employment, business fixed investment and the government fi-
nancial balances. Private consumption, however, is negatively influ-
enced and consumer prices are on a higher level. 
As well as for the seperate control of S0 2 and NOx emissions as for 
the simultaneous control of both pollutants the macroeconomic impacts 
are very small. The percentage changes in economic indicators, induced 
by the pollution control programma, for most countries, are not larger 
than 5 to 10% of annual changes observed in the recent past (1979-
1985). Only for some countries, for some specific indicators, the im-
pact is somewhat more significant but still very small. 
Within the frame of this more general conclusion it is also clear that 
the proposed Directive, with respect to S0 2 emission control, has a 
rather negative influence on the Irish economy whereas the impacts are 
more positive for France and Portugal, which have no pollution control 
costs, as well as for Greece and Spain. The proposed Directive on large 
combustion plants, with respect to the control of NOx emissions has a 
hardly noticeable impact on the economies of most EC countries. The 
impact on the Federal Republic of Germany is more significant due to 
the countrie's own stringent abatement policy. The macroeconomic im-
pacts for Italy, Portugal, France and Greece are small, but notably 
positive. 
The simultaneous control of S0 2 and NOx emissions has negative con-
sequences for the main macroeconomic indicators in Ireland. For Germa-
ny, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the positive impacts more or 
less equal the negative impacts. For France, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
the macroeconomic effects are positive. For the Italian, the Belgian 
and the Danish economy results are positive as well although to a smal-
ler extent. 
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Despite these differences among countries, and despite several elements 
of uncertainty, it can generally be concluded that the proposed Direc-
tive on large combustion plants is likely to have only small macro-
economic impacts for the EC countries. 
- -----~------ -------------------------------- ------
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APPENDIX A. DAMAGE AND BENEFITS 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this appendix is to supply insight on the: 
* information that can be made available on the present monetary 
damage caused by "acid rain" in Europe, especially in the European 
Community (E.C.), and the possibilities to express the damage in 
monetary terms (monetary damage); 
* extent to which it would be possible to estimate the benefits 
(i.e. avoided damage) of "acid rain" control strategies in the 
E.C. 
Generally the term "acid rain" is used as a collective noun for diffe-
rent types of air pollution. Acidification usually pertains to the dry 
and wet deposition from the atmosphere of pollutants which have been 
transformed into acids. However, "acid rain" also incorporates photo-
chemical oxidants (ozone) and those pollutants (e.g. hydrocarbons) 
which play a part in the formation of acids or photochemical oxidants. 
Apart from S0 2 , NOx and to a lesser extent NH 3 , hydrocarbons and 
ozone are important. Generally it is impossible to distinguish between 
a direct impact of these pollutants and their indirect impact through 
acidification or photochemical smog. Most of the time a cocktail of 
different pollutants in combination with other stress-factors (drought, 
frost, diseases etc.) is likely to cause negative effects on the envi-
ronment. In this appendix the term "acid rain" will be used as a syno-
nym for acidification, ozone and their precursors. 
"Acid rain" has effects on practically all levels of ecosystems. The 
vitality and life expectancy of vegetation, especially forests is redu-
ced. Various species of flora and fauna disappear or suffer from redu-
ced growth. Also an increase in the vulnerability for fungi and "virus" 
infections is possible. Sensitive soils and surface waters are altered, 
sometimes irreversibly. Materials like steel and zinc, and the cultu-
ral heritage (buildings, stained glass) are deteriorating. "Acid rain" 
may also constitute a threat to human health due to the increased in-
take of heavy metals resulting from bio-accumulation or corrosion of 
water-works. Direct effects on human morbidity and mortality are also 
possible although there is no general agreement on this subject and the 
impact is not due to acidification in the sense described above. Table 
A.l gives a preliminary overview of damage categories and acidifying 
----------------- -- ----- ----------------- --- ---------------------- ------------------------------- ----
A2 
emissions and photochemical oxydants that are likely to (partly) cause 
damage. 
Table A.l. Damage categories and "acid rain" 
"acid rain" components S0 2 NOx Hydro- NH 3 Ozone 
damage category carbons 
1 Forests and vegetation X X X X 
(crops i.e.) 
2 Other terrestrial and X X X 
aquatic ecosystems 
3 Buildings and materials X X X 
4 Recreation not available 
5 Human health X X ? 
6 Non-user benefits X? X? X? 
To fulfil the aim of this appendix, data would be necessary on each of 
the steps in the relation acidifying and photochemical emissions and 
damage expressed in monetary terms (see figure A.l). 
I 
emission 
control 
policy 
monetary 
damage 
(benefits) 
dispersion 
and trans-
formation 
3 
H---------~----------~wet and dry 
2b deposition 
I 
Sb 
import and 1 export 
I 
I 
monetary physical 
evaluation damage 
7 6 
Figure A.l. Emissions-monetary damage chain 
4 
t 
acidification/ 
other impacts 
Sa 
Step Sa (acidification/other impacts and physical damage) involves the 
construction of physical damage functions: relations between levels of 
exposure and the quantative expression of the effects of this exposure 
on receptors (materials, flora, fauna, men). This physical damage for 
example may be expressed in terms of reduced crops, square metres of 
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zinc corroded, percentages of death, hectares of forest suffering from 
growth reduction if the dose-response function is known. If the effect 
is expressed directly in monetary units (step Sb, figure A.l) the rela-
tion between exposure and effect is called a monetary damage function 
(James et al., 1978). The benefits of European policies to control 
acidifying and photochemical emissions can at first hand be seen as the 
avoided monetary damage as a consequence of that policy compared to a 
reference case (i.e. no policy changes after 1980 or business-as-usu-
al). At second hand the benefits might also, in a broader sense, be 
grasped as the willingness of people to pay for the improvement in the 
environment resulting from the proposed pollution-control policy. Or 
moreover the benefits could be seen as the compensation that would be 
necessary if such reduction in emissions and effects would not take 
place (Kneese, 1984). 
As can be seen in figure A.l. two approaches are possible for relating 
acidification effects of ozone and direct impacts of their precursors 
to monetary damage: the indirect method (step Sa/6) and the direct 
method (step Sb). In the first case by using dose response functions 
first a physical damage function is constructed which then is trans-
formed into a monetary damage function. In the latter method the mone-
tary value is estimated directly (i.e. by measuring willingness to 
pay). Table A.2 shows the different techniques, within both methods, 
and their (possible) application to damage categories. 
Using these theoretical concepts as a tool this appendix starts with 
a description of studies on monetary damage due to "acid rain" in the 
Netherlands. Subsequently, Europe-wide studies on the same subject are 
reviewed although a thorough examination of underlying concepts was not 
yet possible. Both sections, insofar as possible, describe the included 
physical effects, the calculated damage (monetary units) and evaluate 
the strength of the observed relation between emissions and monetary 
damage. The possibilities to estimate the benefits of control policies 
in the E.C. are then examined. This section compares an "heroic" 
attempt to assess these benefits (OECD) and tries to yield some insight 
in recent developments in model building on the relations emissions-
physical damage (Phoxa and IIASA). In addition the potential to reduce 
sulphur deposition in the EC of an EC policy, is presented with the 
help of data on, the sources of deposition in the EC, and of the recep-
tors of emissions caused by EC countries. Conclusions and recommenda-
tions are presented in the fifth section. 
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Table A.2. Techniques to estimate benefits in monetary terms and their appli-
cation to damage, caused by "acid rain". 
Method I Technique Damage category (benefits) 
I I 
Forest Other ter- Buil- Recre- Human Non user 
-
l
and ve restr~al d~ngs lat~on lhealth lbenef~tsl 
and aqua-
tic flora 
and fauna I I X I I 
I cap~tal" 
I ~ I"Risk eva-
1
1 I ~~ X ~~ 
I I lluation" I 
I : I"Surveys" I X X I X X? I I 
I ~ I Market price I X I X I X I I I I 
11 ------11 ~:~::~:~~---11 --::~-~=- ~:-:;:::~::~11 --------11 -------11 -------11 --------D price diffe-~ I rences I I I I I I 
E S t (' health forests non user 
1 
urveys lvan.ous lea egon.es 
I 
~.e. , , 
c (contingent benefits) 
I 
T I valuation, 
I I 
willingness 
Ito pay) 
Source (Ministry of Housing, 1985; Oosterhuis, 1984; Ministry of Housing, 1984) 
2. Damage and benefits in the Netherlands 
Recent studies in the Netherlands' on physical damage, caused by acidi-
fication, ozone and their precursors, considered effects on soil, 
groundwater, vegetation, surface water and animals that form part of 
aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems (MHPE, 1984). In earlier stages 
damage to buildings, materials, crops and health has been assessed. 
Table A.3 summarises the results. 
Effects on vegetation and forests are probably due to air pollution al-
though the exact processes are not completely known. Damage to surface 
waters and soil can largely be attributed to acidification by S0 2 , 
NOx and NH 3 • Damage to buildings and materials is largely caused by 
S0 2 and to a certain extent by NOx and its derivatives. Ozone can 
• 
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play a role in deterioration of certain materials (paper, rubber, 
leather, textiles). At present levels of air pollution, the occurrence 
of adverse health effects is highly uncertain. Epidemiological studies 
do affirm a relation between morbidity and air pollution (Nentjes, 
1986), but on the other hand present S0 2 concentrations do not exceed 
the advised threshold concentrations advised by the Dutch Health Coun-
cil; however, present levels of NOx and ozone probably do have ad-
verse effects on vegetation and health (ERL, 1986). For the latter ef-
fects no estimate is available on the related monetary damage • 
Table A.3. Effects and "acid rain" in the Netherlands 
"acid rain" pollutants S0 2 NOx Hydro- NH 3 Ozone I Remarks 
damage categorie carbons 
1. Forests and vegetation X X X X In combination 
(crops i.e.) 
2. Other terrestrial and X 
aquatic ecosystems 
3. Buildings and materials X 
4. Recreation 
5. Human health X 
6. Non-user benefits 
X X 
X 
X 
with stress 
factors 
X Especially s 
X S0 2 in combi 
nation with 
particulate 
matter 
02 
Source: (Ministry of Housing, 1986; Tweede Kamer, 1984; Oosterhuis, 
1984; MPE, 1984) 
Table A.4 shows the available data on monetary damage, caused by acidi-
fication, ozone and their precursors, in the Netherlands. The presented 
figures are an underestimate of the real damage: 
- loss of capital in the case of forests, valued at 3-10 billion 
guilders and accumulated damage to natural ecosystems (200-300 
million guilders) are not taken into account. 
certain categories of damage, i.e. the disappearance of unique 
ecosystems, cultural heritage, are not valued. 
- because part of the damage is estimated on the basis of costs of 
the present (not repaired) damage this is an underestimate. Wil-
lingness to pay or compensation-costs-methods probably would yield 
higher values especially because non-user benefits (existence val-
ue, option value etc.) would be taken into account. Recent studies 
in Germany (Schultz, 1985) and in the Netherlands (Oosterhuis and 
Van der Linden, 1987) using contingent valuation for improvement 
in forests affirm this. 
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- no estimate is included for the monetary damage to human health. 
The expected damage may constitute a significant part of the total 
damage. 
Table A.4. Damage due to "acid rain" in the Netherlands 
Damage category 1Damage 3 (million DFL) !Method (techniques) 
Present 
1. forests and 565-655 
crops (agriculture) 
2. other terrestrial 
and aquatic 
ecosystems 
3. buildings and 
materials 
4. recreation 
5. health 4 ) 
TOTAL 
General notes: 
5- 30 
95-140 
pm 
665-825 
Future 2 
735-1205 
15- 55 
115- 190 
pm 
865-1450 
used to estimate damage 
market prices (costs of 
compensation and market 
price changes (= not 
repaired damages) 
market prices (costs of 
compensating measures 
and not repaired damage) 
as 1 and 2 
no recent reliable 
estimate available 
1) Source (Ministry of Housing, 1986; MHPE, 1984; Tweede Kamer, 1984). 
2) Damage if level of deposition is maintained. 
3) Damage is calculated in guilders for different years mostly after 
1980. No indexation is used. 
4 ) Using an outdated (1974) study and a safety margin of +40% and -30%, 
damage of 700-1400 million guilders has been calculated, a not very 
useful indicator (Opschoor, 1987). 
At this moment little information is available to estimate the benefits 
of a reduction of emissions. Damage to crops is probably reduced pro-
portionally with deposition. Forest damage will only decline signifi-
cantly (if this is even possible!) if deposition is reduced to 80% of 
the present level. Surface water and soils are sometimes irreversibly 
damaged and in some cases recovery will be possible. On the link be-
tween emission and health, no reliable answer is available. The physi-
cal damage function of buildings and materials seems to be a S-shaped 
curve in relation to S0 2-concentrations. Additional research is being 
carried out ("additioneel prograrmna verzuring") on the relation between 
acidification and physical damage. If results are made available these 
can be used to update the above table. Figure A.2 depicts the results. 
• 
• 
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missing link 
-- link established dispersion 
and trans-
formation 
lza 
l 3 4 ~-+-------r-------+--~1 wet and dry 1-------~-----,----' 2b I deposition I I 
I l 
emission I Sb 
control 1
11 
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Figure A.2. Missing links in the Dutch "acidifying and photochemical 
emissions-monetary damage. 
Concluding it can be stated that: 
it's very likely that "acid rain" is the major cause of damage to 
forests, crops, other terrestri~l and aquatic ecosystems, buildings 
and materials. Not only acid deposition plays a role, but also ozone 
and other stress-factors; 
- no agreement exists on the extent to which human health is being ad-
versely affected by "acid rain"; 
present damage due to "acid rain" is estimated at Dfl 700-800 mil-
lion; future damage will rise to Dfl 900-1500 million per year if the 
deposition level is maintained; 
- the above figures are underestimates because certain damage catego-
ries are not monetarily valued and others are not included, especial-
ly non-user benefits; 
- though some information on the shape of the physical damage functions 
exist, especially for crops, certain materials and buildings, there 
is insufficient information at this moment to supply a comprehensive 
and reliable estimate of the benefits of emission reductions. 
3. European damage studies 
Relying for the moment on a few international studies that are more or 
less extensive, table A.S shows the observed relations between damage 
categories and "acid rain". 
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Table A.5. Damage categories and "acid rain" in Europe 
"acid rain"' so 2 NOx Hydro- NH 3 Ozone I Remarks 
pollutants I carbons 
damage category 
1. Forests and vegeta- X X X In combination 
tion (crops i.e.) with factors 
such as soil, 
climate, geo-
lgraphy and 
!forest manage-
ment 
2. Other terrestrial X X ? 
and aquatic eco-
systems 
3. Buildings and mate- X Little data on 
rials 3 NOx in combi-
nation with 
particles (TSP) 
4. Recreation 
5. Human health X ? X acidification-+ 
metal-+health 
weakly 
6. Non-user benefits n.a. 
General remarks: 
Source: (ERL, 1983; OECD, 1984; OECD, 1981) 
1) at this stage results are tentative. 
2) ? = results uncertain X = significant positive relation observed. 
[] = no relation observed available 
3) Other observed categories: visibility, soiling and cleaning inclu-
ded in category 4. Recreational benefits are related to surface 
water pollution. No clear relation between "acid rain" and this 
damage could be established from the literature. 
Analogous to the approach in table A.2, table A.6 might be completed 
and reviewed. This could partly be done through the examination of in-
ventories made by the OECD (1981), ERL (1983) and Bergmann (1985) and 
the underlying national studies. Information from recent national stu-
dies (e.g. from Germany and the Netherlands) would be necessary to ful-
fill this task. 
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Table A.6. Monetary damage in Europe due to "acid rain" decomposed by 
method and damage categories (milliard ECU of 1983). 
Technique Damage category (benefits) 
Forest Other Buildings Recre- Human Non user Total 
and vege- terrestrial and at ion health benefits 
tat ion (+ and aquatic materials 
crops) flora and 
fauna 
"Human capital" 
"Risk evalu-
at ion" 
"Surveys" 
Market price 1.2 0.03 0.5-2.7 1.7-3.9 
(changes) 
---------------- --------- ----------- ---------
------ ------ -------- -------
Hedonic price 
difference 
Surveys (contin-
gent valuation, 
willingness to 
pay) 
1.2 +pm 0.03 +pm 0.5-2.7 pm pm pm 1.7-3.9 
General remarks: 
Source: (ERL, 1983) 
1) Figures have to be completed! 
2) 1 $ == 1 ECU. 
Some of the results reached by Bergmann (1985) are presented in table 
A.7. At this moment no data are available to break down the calculated 
monetary damage over the different techniques that have been used to 
establish the estimates. The results in table A.7 should be looked at 
with scepticism because: 
- estimates of Bergmann are insufficiently based on data on the 
"stocks at risk", 
- some of the national studies used as a reference are outdated; for 
others the actual value may be questioned, 
- an assumed share of the damage reported is arbitrary ascribed to 
sulphur deposition alone. 
damage based on studies of various years is expressed in tons of 
sulphur deposited in 1980 only. 
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All 
Notwithstanding this critisism the study by Bergmann supplies a useful 
overview of damage studies in Europe. 
Using the above information and the completed table A.6 a picture could 
be given of the monetary damage categories that have been explored and 
the physical damage likely to occur (using table A.5) but not yet eva-
luated monetary. The distribution over different methods will, to a 
certain extent, permit conclusions to be drawn on the uncertainty in 
the estimates and the damage categories where new techniques could be 
applied and could result in extensive damage estimates (e.g. health or 
willingness to pay for forests and cultural heritage). Additional in-
formation on more recent (inter)national studies on physical and mone-
tary damage, however, is indispensable for this aim. 
4. Assessing benefits 
This section first describes a study of the OECD on the benefits of 
controlling sulphur emissions. This is followed by an overview of the 
available information on the (acidifying and photochemical) emissions 
-monetary-damage chain. Finally the sources of sulphur deposition in 
the EC and the receptors of sulphur emitted by the EC are presented. 
An early OECD study 
An attempt has been made by OECD to estimate the benefits of control-
ling acidifying emissions (the study was limited to sulphur dioxide) 
(OECD, 1983). The report considered three types of scenarios: 
Case I - a reference level including control technologies likely to 
be installed in 1985 (S0 2 emissions in 1985 21% higher than 
(1974); 
Case II - in which 0.05% of Gross Domestic Product is spent annually 
on emission control (1985 S0 2 emissions 3% lower than 
1974); 
Case III - in which the best available technology is applied resulting 
in a 37% reduction of S0 2 emissions in 1985 over the 1974 
level. 
Using long range transport and urban dispersion models ambient air qua-
lity and deposition were estimated. On the basis of these atmospheric 
concentrations the physical impact was defined and translated in terms 
of avoided damage. Results are shown in table A.B. 
The OECD in its study remarks that more understanding is needed about 
the stock at risk with respect to materials and effects on modern coa-
tings, historical monuments and building materials. Also more research 
is necessary on direct and indirect effects on crops and forests. The 
OECD concludes that effects on health are highly uncertain though pos-
sibly representing the greatest benefit. Damage on aquatic ecosystems 
is important in Sweden and Norway though more studies are needed. Cri-
tics of the OECD study (Barnes, 1983) have made the following general 
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comment regarding the estimate of benefits: 
1. the study relies on the implicit assumption that damage attribu-
ted to sulphur compounds collectively declines pro rato if S0 2 
emissions decrease, thus ignoring atmospheric chemistry (in par-
ticular sulphates), 
2. meteorology and climatology of the three base years 1974, 1975 
and 1976 may be similar but are not likely to be typical for the 
rest of the 20th century, and so related dispersion patterns are 
doubtful. 
Table A.B. Avoided damage accruing from a shift from case I to case III in S0 2 
emissions in West-Europe (in million $) 
Damage category (benefits) JMe- Jrechnique 
lthodl 
I I I I 
!Forest Jothe: terr-J~uild- I 
1
and veg- 1 estr~al 1 ~ngs I 
1
etation land aquat-
1
and mat-
1 I (+crops) ic flora 
1
erials I 
Recre-
ation 
!Human INon user T 
lhealthlbenefitsl 0 I 
I I I TALl I I 
"Human 
I I capital" 
N 
D I "Risk eva-
1 I luation" 
R 
E !"surveys" 
c 
T IMarketprice 
(changes) 
Hedonic 
D price 
I difference 
R 
E 
c 
T 
Surveys 
(contingent 
valuation 
willingness 
to pay 
TOTAL 
214 1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
and fauna 
33 2 
--------'-----------
Source: OECD (1983). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I no 
9633 reliable 410-
estimate 10260 
580-
14400 
1) Effect on forests not calculated. On crops for 11 countries. 
2) Only for aquatic ecosystems in Scandinavia. 
3) Only for certain materials i.e. steel. 
170-
4140 
1620-
11470 
1790-
115610 
4) Figures refer to morbidity only. Mortality expressed in increased life-
expectancy. 
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The emissions-(monetary)damage chain 
The above case study already shows that knowledge at this moment is too 
incomplete to make even an educated guess of the benefits of an Europe-
an emission control strategy. The case study also indicates that seve-
ral techniques for evaluating the damage are under exploited. Although 
some promising research has been and is being established figure A.3 
shows that still some important links are partly missing . 
dispersion 
and trans-
formation 
3 
----------------------~ wet and dry 
2b deposition 
1 
Sb 
4 
emission 
control 
policy 
import and 
export ~------------ .__a_c_i_d_i_f_i_c-ra_t_i_on--~ I _and other impacts 
~1-----
monetary 
monetary 
damage 
(benefits) ~--- evaluation ~----
7 6 
--------- "missing" link 
link reasonably well known 
physical 
damage ~------ Sa 
Figure A.3. Missing links in the European "acid rain" emission-monetary 
damage chain 
Information based on table A.8, Phoxa and IIASA studies (Alcamo, Buil-
tjes) shows that: 
- dispersion and transformation models as well as imports and ex-
ports of pollutants other than so2 have not been established yet, 
although IIASA is-investigating NOx, and Phoxa NOx, NH 3 and 
hydrocarbons (step 2a/b, 3, ~); 
- there is not yet a reliable and politicaly established database 
for non-S0 2 emissions (step 1/3). 
A preliminary assessment of available damage studies shows that (Perry 
et. al. ; 1987) : 
there is no accepted view on the exact relation between acidifica-
tion, ozone and direct effects of their precursors and the impact 
of stress factors on physical damage (step Sa) for all damage ca-
tegories, notably forests. 
- methods and techniques to measure monetary benefits directly (step 
Sb) still suffer from growing pains and have not been widely ap-
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plied. Although theoretically different types of biases could be 
avoided, in practice this seems to be more difficult (see also 
Opschoor, 1987); 
- methods to measure benefits directly (step SA) are lacking avail-
able data on the stock at risk, and do not always take into ac-
count changes in demand and supply, as a response of consumers and 
producers, and the impact on market prices. 
The potential of an EC policy to reduce (sulphur)deposition in the EC 
Part of the emission reduction reached by an EC control policy will 
accrue to non-EC countries. On the other hand part of the acid deposi-
ted within the EC is received from non-EC member states. 
These aspects limit the possibilities of an EC policy to control depo-
sition on the EC and in addition mean that part of the benefits of such 
an EC control policy will accrue to non-EC countries. On the other hand 
it should not be forgotten that in the present situation the damage, 
including welfare losses, in non-EC countries is partly caused by the 
EC. 
Currently source receptor matrices, based on EMEP (European Monitoring 
and Evaluation Programme of long range transmission of air pollutants), 
are available for the emission and deposition of sulphur (ECE, 1986). 
The figures are having a 50% margin of uncertainty. From figure A.4. it 
can be seen that some 25% of the sulphur deposited in the EC comes from 
non-EC countries. About 60% is caused by the larger EC member states 
(FR, FRG, IT, SP and the UK). To some extent the EC thus is able to 
control the sulphur deposited on its own surface. 
12% 
2o/o 
13% 
Be 
rnm 
.Fro 
m~ 
DIT 
8f'.l.. 
DSP 
mU< 
ra 011-ERfC 
El N:J-.4EC 
Figure A.4. Sulphur deposited in the EC and its sources in 1984. 
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Part of the emission reduction reached by the EC, however, will flow 
over to non-EEC member states as figure A.S. shows. 
2o/o 
10% 
13o/o 
10% 
•a 
[)fR 
IIFR3 
IDG=4 
[]IT 
8N.. 
IIISP 
~U< 
~ OTHelFC 
[i~EC 
Figure A.S. Sulphur emitted by the EC and its receptors in 1984. 
However, the actual impact also depends on the distribution of control 
measures over the EC member states since some member states deposit 
more sulphur within the EC than other member states. On the other hand 
several member states (e.g. Greece, Italy, Spain) hardly receive sul-
phur from other EC countries. 
Ofcourse the distribution of "benefits" will also depend on the type of 
emissions controlled: high stack emissions, emissions with a more local 
dispersation pattern, etc. One might conclude that to a certain extent 
an EC control policy is an effective means of controlling (sulphur)acid 
deposition on the EC surface. However, part of the benefits (in the 
sense of reduced damage) will accrue to non EEC countries and the dis-
tribution of benefits over the EC member states might vary consider-
ably. 
5. Conclusions 
Some attempts (OECD, ERL, Bergmann) have been made to assess the damage 
of "acid rain" (i.e. sulphur emissions) in Europe. In those studies not 
all damage categories, or pollutants have been assessed nor have al the 
available techniques to assess damage been applied. 
Hence there exists no updated and. comprehensive review of the present 
damage due to "acid rain" in Europe or in the EC. Therefore it seems to 
make sense, before trying to grasp the "benefits" of pollution control 
policies at the EC level, first to inventorise recent damage studies 
covering parts of Europe and the European Community. In doing so the 
Al6 
applied methods, observed damage categories and pollutants may be taken 
into account in order to perceive gaps and possibilities for promising 
research. At the same time an inventory of research efforts on the re-
lation emissions-deposition-physical damage i~ needed in order to de-
termine which pollutants, which atmospheric and deposition processes 
and physical damage categories could be included in a study and which 
probably not. 
• 
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